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Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific
Revolution: Accounting for Transaction Costs
in Rule of Reason Analysis
Alan J. Meese*
This Article contends that modern rule of reason analysis, informed by workable
competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, is suitable for evaluating only a
subset of agreements that may reduce transaction costs. The Article distinguishes between
“technological” and “non-technological” transaction costs. Technological transaction
costs entail the bargaining and information costs first emphasized by Ronald Coase,
while non-technological transaction costs result from more fundamental departures from
perfect competition, departures creating a risk of opportunism that accompanies
relationship-specific investments.
Modern law does accurately assess restraints that may reduce technological transaction
costs—costs that are analogous to the sort of production costs recognized by the trade-off
model. However, this same methodology is poorly suited for analyzing restraints that
may reduce non-technological transaction costs. In particular, the model treats nonrestraint price and output as a “competitive” baseline against which to measure a
restraint’s impact. As a result, tribunals applying the trade-off model may misinterpret
benefits of such restraints, such as increased investment and resulting higher prices, as
exercises of market power. Given the baselines that courts use, a test focused on price or
output will condemn many restraints that enhance welfare.
Several considerations explain courts’ failure to incorporate the lessons of transaction
cost economics (“TCE”) when analyzing contracts that may reduce non-technological
transaction costs. For one thing, the trade-off paradigm has shed light on important
antitrust problems. Practitioners of a successful paradigm do not readily abandon it.
Moreover, Coase’s seminal work on TCE focused exclusively on technological
transaction costs analogous to ordinary production costs easily recognized within the
trade-off paradigm. Furthermore, proponents of TCE actually embraced and refined the
trade-off model for analyzing mergers producing technological efficiencies. Finally, lower
courts have modified aspects of the modern rule of reason test, staving off anomalies that
can undermine a paradigm’s support.
Courts should accordingly “reframe” their analysis, selecting a different baseline against
which to measure the impact of restraints that may reduce non-technological transaction
costs. That is, tribunals should ask whether the restraint produces higher prices (or lower
output) compared to the prices or output that would obtain if the defendants made
specific investments without a safeguard against opportunism. Such an approach would
hold constant the other variables that influence price and output, thereby isolating the
impact of the restraint simpliciter on market power and/or transaction costs.

* Ball Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. J.D., The University of Chicago Law
School; A.B., The College of William & Mary. The William & Mary School of Law provided a summer
research grant that supported this project.
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Introduction
“No answer is what the wrong question begets.” So said
constitutional theorist Alex Bickel, speaking of a particular brand of
1
constitutional originalism. Antitrust lawyers must be wary of borrowing
ideas from constitutional sources: Such borrowing has, in the past,
disserved consumers and the rest of society, leading courts to abjure
consumer welfare in pursuit of values not properly cognizable under the
2
Sherman Act’s rule of reason. Still, there is a sense in which Bickel’s
admonition applies with greater force to courts and enforcement agencies

1. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 103 (1962).
2. Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209, 209-10 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006 & Supp.
III 2009)). Compare United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611–12 (1972) (banning reasonable
ancillary restraints because they interfered with the “freedom” of traders to sell wherever they
pleased), and Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 374 (1933), with Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (explaining that the rule of reason is concerned
only with economic impact of restraints), Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)
(same), and Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911) (holding that the Sherman
Act bans contracts producing monopoly or its consequences, that is, higher prices, reduced output or
lower quality).
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evaluating restraints on rivalry under the rule of reason. Here, the wrong
question may do more than provide “no” answer. Instead, the wrong
question may provide the wrong answer, leading courts and enforcement
agencies to condemn, as harmful, restraints that actually enhance the
welfare of consumers and the rest of society.
Under current law, some restraints are unlawful per se, because they
3
reduce rivalry without offsetting benefits. Still, most restraints on rivalry
nonetheless avoid per se condemnation, often because they may
plausibly reduce “transaction costs”—that is, the costs parties would
4
otherwise incur by relying upon an unbridled market. Courts analyze
such restraints under the rule of reason, inquiring directly into their
5
impact on consumers and the rest of society. First identified by Ronald
Coase in 1937, such costs can take many forms, and this Article proposes
a simple but powerful taxonomy of them. In the first category are
“technological transaction costs,” the sort of garden variety bargaining
and information costs that generally precede a transaction, which Coase
6
emphasized in his seminal work on the subject. In the second category
are what this Article calls “non-technological transaction costs,”
particularly the risk of opportunism, that postdate relationship-specific
investments that enhance product differentiation. Coase’s early work
sparked a revolution in how economists understand and interpret nonstandard contracts, with the result that agreements that may reduce
either form of transaction cost avoid immediate condemnation and are
7
scrutinized under the rule of reason.
This Article contends that, despite these significant advances in
economic theory, courts and agencies are asking—or at least purport to
be asking—“the wrong question” when conducting rule of reason
analysis of restraints that may overcome certain forms of transaction
costs. Because of administrative costs, courts cannot observe directly the
impact of a restraint on social welfare, but must instead seek to discern
that impact by relying upon various shortcuts that conserve these
administrative costs. While current standards will produce accurate
analysis of restraints that defendants claim reduce technological
transaction costs, they can falsely condemn restraints that avoid per se
condemnation because they may reduce non-technological transaction
costs. In particular, courts and agencies place undue emphasis upon a
restraint’s supposed impact on the “price” (and output) of a defendant’s
product, an impact courts and agencies purport to ascertain in various
ways. This contention naturally raises the question why, more than
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 87–94 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra notes 274–81 and accompanying text.
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seventy years after Coase’s revolutionary insight, courts and leading
scholars have articulated standards that properly evaluate some
restraints that reduce transaction costs, but are biased against others. The
Article finds the answer in price theory’s perfect competition and
workable competition models of industrial organization, models that
began to influence antitrust doctrine in the mid-twentieth century,
particularly at the behest of the so-called “Harvard School” of antitrust
8
analysis. The workable competition model, in particular, posited a
comparison of a restraint’s market power effects, on the one hand, and
any resulting technological efficiencies, on the other, a comparison that
Oliver Williamson later formalized in his famous “partial equilibrium
9
trade-off model” in 1968. Application of this model and associated
assumptions led to the so-called “inhospitality tradition” of antitrust law,
whereby courts and the enforcement agencies condemned most non10
standard agreements.
Despite the rise of transaction cost economics, this trade-off model
still acts as a Kuhnian paradigm guiding the solution to many antitrust
problems, including the analysis of horizontal mergers and conduct by
monopolists, each of which may simultaneously enhance market power
and produce technological efficiencies such as economies of scale.
Application of this model, in turn, rests upon the identification of a prerestraint baseline of price, output, and quality, against which to compare
the impact of a restraint or transaction. In the rule of reason context, the
trade-off model, which assumes away externalities, transaction costs,
specific investments, production differentiation, and changes in market
demand, influences the “baseline” of price and output that courts employ
11
when attempting to discern the impact of a restraint. Thus, courts and
agencies treat the non-restraint baseline of price and/or output—often
“discerned” via a thought experiment—as a workably competitive
equilibrium, and thus a valid point of comparison with the post-restraint
12
price or output. Moreover, the model only recognizes efficiencies that
tend to reduce the price of the defendant’s product compared to the pre13
restraint baseline. Given these assumptions, a restraint that appears to
result in higher prices compared to the non-restraint baseline necessarily
reflects an exercise of market power, to the detriment of consumers and
the rest of society.
Reliance upon the partial equilibrium trade-off model and its
limiting assumptions is not surprising. Both the Harvard and Chicago

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra notes 31–86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 55–57, 119–21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113–14, 119–21 and accompanying text.
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Schools of antitrust analysis have expressly or implicitly invoked this
14
paradigm as a proper vehicle for analyzing antitrust problems. The
Harvard School, in particular, has for decades premised its antitrust
policy upon an effort to implement the prescriptions of workable
competition and has advocated a rule of reason test reflecting the
15
dictates of the partial equilibrium paradigm. The Supreme Court, in
turn, has cited Harvard pronouncements when articulating key facets of
16
the rule of reason test, leaving the agencies and lower courts with little
apparent choice but to follow suit, though some lower courts have in fact
17
departed from Supreme Court doctrine. While the Harvard School has
internalized important elements of transaction cost economics (“TCE”),
particularly when advocating narrower per se rules, it has stubbornly
clung to the trade-off model—which produces useful results in other
contexts—when analyzing restraints that may reduce transaction costs
under the rule of reason. The courts and agencies have followed
18
Harvard’s teachings in this respect.
Examination of “price” (or output) to evaluate a restraint’s impact
would seem to make sense, given the Sherman Act’s singular focus on
“consumer welfare.” Indeed, courts and scholars have argued that such a
standard economizes on the cost of identifying restraints that exercise
19
market power to the detriment of consumers. For instance, proponents
of this view contend that if a restraint does or would result in higher
20
prices or lower output, it is presumptively an exercise of market power.
Moreover, if a restraint does, in fact, reduce transaction costs, basic
economics informed by the perfect competition model would seem to
predict that such a reduction in costs would manifest itself in lower
prices, other things being equal. Hence, reliance upon this standard
would seem to economize on the costs of determining whether the
benefits of a restraint counteract its purported harms.
Closer analysis suggests that the actual impact of such restraints is
more complicated than basic economics grounded in price theory and the
workable competition model would suggest. Certainly some reductions
in transaction costs resulting from complete or partial integration will
manifest themselves as reduced prices when compared to the partial
equilibrium model’s non-restraint baseline. Indeed, bargaining and
information costs, the original “transaction costs” that Ronald Coase
identified in 1937, are relatively slight departures from perfect

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 119–31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 101, 109–11 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 99–127 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
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competition and are analogous, if not identical, to the sort of
technological production costs recognized by the perfect and workable
competition models. Thus, the dominant paradigm for analyzing trade
restraints, developed within the confines of the workable competition
model, readily incorporates Coase’s original insight that vertical
integration can reduce technological transaction costs, even though the
21
workable competition model did not recognize such costs. When a
restraint purportedly reduces these costs without impacting other
economic variables, the current method for analyzing restraints,
influenced by the partial equilibrium trade-off model, produces correct
results. Indeed, the technological nature of the transaction costs that
Coase identified likely explains why the partial equilibrium paradigm
and the resulting hostility toward non-standard contracts survived
Coase’s 1937 insight completely unscathed. Paradigms and their
practitioners are stubborn, and the partial equilibrium paradigm is no
exception. Because this paradigm incorporated technological transaction
costs so readily, even economists who embraced Coase’s analysis would
have had no reason to question the broad application of the trade-off
model until other scholars rediscovered Coase’s insight and identified
non-technological transaction costs that such agreements could
eliminate.
Still, courts and the enforcement agencies err when they employ the
partial equilibrium paradigm to examine restraints that may reduce nontechnological costs. While the partial equilibrium model recognizes
technological efficiencies, it also assumes constant consumer demand and
the absence of transaction costs and externalities. Many non-standard
contracts, however, lower costs by reducing the risk of opportunism that
arises because of relationship-specific investments and resulting product
differentiation. Such opportunism is an externality, made possible by
imperfect institutional arrangements such as poorly-specified property
rights and other conditions that contravene the workable competition
model from which courts derive their price and output baselines when
conducting rule of reason analysis. Because the partial equilibrium
model’s baseline does not incorporate such externalities or shifts in
demand, reliance on the trade-off model to evaluate restraints that may
reduce non-technological transaction costs can produce incorrect results.
Simply put, reductions in non-technological transaction costs bear no
similarity to technological efficiencies and can manifest themselves as
prices that are higher than those that defendants would charge but for
the restraint, at least as courts and agencies currently frame their analysis
and measure the impact of such restraints. By facilitating the
differentiation or promotion of a product, these restraints can enhance

21. See infra notes 211–15.
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the demand for the item, as well as the cost of producing and promoting
it, resulting in a price that is higher than the defendant would charge
without the restraint and accompanying investments.
To be sure, removal of the restraint simpliciter could result in
reduced prices compared to those that postdate the investments the
restraint accompanies, at least in the short run, but this reduction would
reflect opportunistic exploitation of specific investments by the party no
longer bound by the restraint that induced such investments in the first
place. Such exploitation and the resulting price and output do not reflect
a stable economic equilibrium, as it will lead defendants to cease
investing in the very activities that created the value being exploited,
thereby reducing the quality and promotion of the defendant’s product.
Thus, the prices resulting from a hypothetical removal of the restraint
reflect opportunistic behavior and resulting externality, contrary to the
partial equilibrium model’s assumption of no externality. They are
economic illusions and do not reflect profitable economic activity, with
the result that the partial equilibrium model cannot provide a useful
vehicle for evaluating such restraints without some modifications.
The rule of reason’s bias against restraints that reduce certain types
of transaction costs is ironic, given current law’s reliance upon the
propensity to reduce such costs as a rationale for sparing certain
22
restraints from per se condemnation. Since the 1960s, various scholars
have argued that numerous restraints deemed harmful by the workable
competition model are actually beneficial efforts to reduce the costs of
relying upon the market, that is, transacting, to conduct economic
23
activity. While courts and enforcement agencies properly incorporate
these revolutionary insights when determining whether a restraint is
unlawful per se, they sometimes ask the wrong question when conducting
rule of reason analysis of restraints that avoid per se condemnation,
giving undue focus to the purported impact that such restraints have
upon the price that defendants charge for their products and/or the
24
output they produce.
The realization that improper framing distorts the outcome of rule
of reason analysis under current standards suggests that courts should
reframe their analysis so as to incorporate the insights of TCE. In
particular, courts should employ a different baseline when determining
whether a restraint results in higher prices or reduced output. That is,
courts should ask whether prices produced by the restraint are higher, or
output lower, than the prices, or output, that would result if the
defendants enter the venture and made specific investments without

22. See infra notes 87–94, 275–81 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 244–56 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 305–12 and accompanying text.
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adopting the challenged restraint. If the restraint would produce higher
prices, or reduced output, compared to this baseline, then a court or
agency could properly conclude that the market power effects of the
restraint overcome any efficiencies. However, courts and agencies will
rarely be able to observe this baseline—which differs markedly from the
sort of rivalry and equilibrium that existed before the restraint—directly,
since firms will only rarely enter a transaction or venture without
adopting a restraint that counteracts opportunism. As a result, courts and
agencies examining a challenged restraint will have to ascertain the costs
and benefits of such restraints directly, thereby determining whether the
restraint produces more harm than good when compared to a
hypothetical world in which the defendants do not adopt the restraint.
Part I of this Article reviews antitrust law’s evolving treatment of
non-standard contracts that often reduce transaction costs. This Part
reviews the inhospitality tradition of antitrust, whereby courts and
agencies, influenced by the models of perfect and workable competition,
condemned various non-standard contracts as unlawful per se, or nearly
so. Such hostility, it is shown, rested upon an application of the partial
equilibrium trade-off model, including the assumption that efficiencies
were technological in nature and that such restraints could not produce
technological efficiencies. This Part then explains how courts and
agencies abandoned various per se rules, after concluding that such
restraints can reduce transaction costs. This Part also details the
standards that courts and agencies now employ when analyzing such
restraints under the rule of reason. Both courts and agencies, it is shown,
focus heavily on the impact that a restraint purportedly has on a
defendant’s price or output. In particular, courts now employ, at the
behest of the Harvard School, various means of identifying a nonrestraint equilibrium price and output and presume unlawful any
restraint that appears to result in prices above—or output below—this
purported equilibrium. While these standards are relatively
uncontroversial, they seem internally incoherent, produce anomalous
results, and are sometimes ignored by lower courts.
Part II examines the rise of “transaction cost economics,” the
economic framework that undermined the inhospitality tradition and led
to the reversal of various rules condemning certain non-standard
contracts. The Part begins by examining Ronald Coase’s 1937 claim that
the firm, a particular non-standard contract, arises to minimize the
“transaction costs” that would beset continuous market contracting
25
between unaffiliated individuals in the real world. This Part also
articulates two categories of transaction costs that non-standard contracts
may reduce. So-called “technological transaction costs,” which Coase

25. See infra notes 176–95 and accompanying text.
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emphasized, involve the bargaining and information costs ordinarily
associated with the term in the law and economics literature. These costs
are closely analogous to the production costs normally recognized within
the perfect and workable competition models. By contrast, so-called
“non-technological transaction costs” result from numerous departures
from perfect competition, including product differentiation and
departures from both perfect and workable competition, namely
relationship-specific investments, opportunism, and the passage of time.
Moreover, departures from perfect competition that give rise to nontechnological transaction costs often reflect improvements over the
allocation of resources and resulting social welfare that atomistic rivalry
would produce in the “real world.” While most law and economics
26
scholars have focused on the first type of transaction costs, scholars
27
interested in antitrust problems have generally focused on the second.
Part III examines the standards currently governing rule of reason
analysis of restraints that reduce transaction costs. These standards,
based as they are on the partial equilibrium paradigm, properly evaluate
restraints that reduce technological transaction costs, which are closely
analogous to the sort of technological efficiencies recognized by the
workable competition model. In such cases, the stubbornness of the
partial equilibrium paradigm has served antitrust law well. However,
these same standards are not up to the task of evaluating restraints that
reduce non-technological transaction costs. In particular, a singular focus
on the price and/or output supposedly produced by a restraint can yield
incorrect results, particularly in light of the baselines that courts employ
when conducting this analysis. This Part ends by offering some possible
explanations for the law’s stubborn failure to adjust partial equilibrium
analysis to account for TCE’s identification of non-technological
transaction costs. As it turns out, several factors, including Coase’s focus
on technological transaction costs, have combined to prevent the
emergence of the sort of crisis that leads scientists to reexamine
paradigms that have served their profession well. Part IV explains how
courts and agencies should reframe rule of reason analysis in light of the
insights offered in Part III.

I. Antitrust’s Treatment of Non-Standard Contracts
Antitrust law’s treatment of non-standard contracts—whether
complete or partial integration—has evolved alongside economic theory
over the last sixty years. This Part examines that evolution and lays the
groundwork for explication of the continuing influence of various
economic theories on antitrust doctrine governing these agreements.

26. See sources cited infra note 191.
27. See infra notes 239–56 and accompanying text.
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Price theory and its workable competition model, it is shown, exercised
significant influence over antitrust doctrine, influence that was mediated
by the stubborn partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm. In particular,
courts condemned numerous restraints as unlawful per se, or nearly so,
because they reduced rivalry between the parties without producing any
apparent offsetting benefits. While the Supreme Court has reversed
many of the more extreme manifestations of this “inhospitality
tradition,” current standards governing rule of reason analysis of such
agreements nonetheless seem to produce anomalous results. At the same
time, some lower courts have modified such standards, seemingly
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, so as to avoid condemning
agreements that apparently produce significant benefits.
A. “Perfect Competition,” “Workable Competition,” and the
Inhospitality Tradition
28

The Sherman Act’s rule of reason requires courts and agencies to
determine whether a challenged agreement “restrains trade”
unreasonably by producing the consequences of monopoly power:
29
reduced output, above-cost pricing, and/or reduced quality. Courts and
agencies have naturally turned to economic theory to guide them in
30
discerning the impact of challenged restraints. For several decades of
the twentieth century, neoclassical price theory was the dominant
economic framework relevant to industrial organization and antitrust
31
policy. Indeed, during this period, industrial organization was little

28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
29. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64 (1911); id. at 61 (defining
“restraint of trade” as “undue restraint of the course of trade,” bringing about monopoly, or
“produc[ing] the same result as monopoly”); id. at 57 (“[At common law] contracts or acts
which . . . were thought to unduly diminish competition and hence to enhance prices—in other words,
to monopolize—came . . . to be spoken of and treated as . . . being in restraint of trade.”); id. at 52
(listing “evils” of monopoly as: (1) the power to fix prices, (2) the power to limit output, and
(3) reduced quality of the monopolized product); id. (characterizing “power arbitrarily to enhance
prices” as one of “the wrongs arising from monopoly”); see also Robert H. Bork, Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775, 802–05, 831–32 (1965); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition
and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 77, 83–89.
30. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law: 1836–1937, at 268 (1991) (“One of
the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an ‘economic approach’
to antitrust problems only in the 1970’s. At most, this ‘revolution’ in antitrust policy represented a
change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its
inception.”); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74
N.C. L. Rev. 219, 226 (1995) (“In almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have employed
models to explain or modify the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement.”).
31. Exemplars of the price-theoretic approach to industrial organization include: Joe S. Bain,
Industrial Organization (1959); Joel B. Dirlam & Alfred E. Kahn, Fair Competition: The Law
and Economics of Antitrust Policy (1954); Carl Kaysen & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy:
An Economic and Legal Analysis (1959); John Perry Miller, Unfair Competition: A Study in
Criteria for the Control of Trade Practices (1941); Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and
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32

more than “applied price theory.” Price theory, which sought to explain
the “performance of business firms in relation to the selling markets for
33
the goods they produce,” rested upon the foundational model of perfect
34
competition. This model imagined a world of continuous, unconstrained
rivalry between innumerable firms resulting in a “competitive” price and
35
“competitive” output. If replicated in all industries, such unbridled
rivalry would produce an instantaneous equilibrium and optimal
allocation of resources, maximizing the value of society’s output in light
36
of its endowment of labor, capital, and other inputs.
To be sure, economists recognized that the real world did not always
37
replicate perfect competition’s various assumptions. Some departures
from these assumptions were the result of imperfect legal arrangements
38
that resulted in a poor specification of property rights. In such cases,
society could enhance welfare by altering legal institutions to eliminate
39
these imperfections. In other instances, however, such departures were
exogenous to legal rules and would arise even in a perfect legal system.
Focusing on these latter departures, economists of the era recognized

Economics, 47 Yale L.J. 34 (1937).
32. See R. H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in The Firm, the Market,
and the Law 59–64 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Industrial Organization] (arguing that, as of 1972,
industrial organization consisted simply of applied price theory). Indeed, after reviewing two of the
period’s leading industrial organization texts, Professor Coase concluded that “essentially, both
[authors] consider the subject of industrial organization as applied price-theory.” Id. at 60; see also
Bain, supra note 31, at 25–27 (describing price theory as a foundation of industrial organization);
Richard Caves, American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance 14 (Otto Eckstein ed., 2d
ed. 1967) (“The subject of ‘industrial organization’ applies the economist’s models of price theory to
the industries in the world around us.”); George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry 1 (1968)
(portraying industrial organization as “price or resource allocation theory”).
33. Bain, supra note 31, at 25–26.
34. See generally Frank M. Machovec, Perfect Competition and the Transformation of
Economics (1995) (tracing the rise of perfect competition model and its influence on microeconomic
theory); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1957)
(tracing the evolution of perfect competition model); see also Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 7–8
(“[T]he rigorous model of the perfectly competitive market is the appropriate starting point of any
definition [of competition].”).
35. See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 76–93 (Augustus M. Kelley, 1964)
(1921) (propounding a detailed articulation of the perfect competition model and the consequences of
perfect competition); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Competitive Price 21–26 (1942); see also
infra notes 153–68 and accompanying text (detailing assumptions of the perfect competition model).
36. See Knight, supra note 35, at 81–86; Stigler, supra note 35, at 26–31.
37. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 35, at 264–90 (introducing the notion of uncertainty and its
impact upon an otherwise competitive market).
38. See A.C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare 172–203 (4th ed. 1962); see also Kaysen & Turner,
supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (explaining how inequality of private and social costs reflects “inappropriate
property institutions”).
39. See, e.g., Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (contending that divergence between
private and social costs establishes case for government operation of an industry); Pigou, supra note
38, at 172–203; Morris A. Copeland, Institutionalism and Welfare Economics, Am. Econ. Rev., Mar.
1958, at 1, 2–7.
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that certain additional departures from perfect competition could
40
actually enhance society’s welfare. For instance, contrary to the
assumptions of perfect competition, firms might produce heterogeneous
products, catering to consumers’ preferences for variety. While such
differentiation could confer modest market power on sellers, the benefits
41
of differentiation often outweighed any harm.
Moreover, in some industries, technological conditions might
require firms to reach significant size to achieve economies of scale or
42
other technological efficiencies. In these circumstances, a departure
from the model’s assumption of innumerable participants in each
industry might produce significant efficiencies, even if that departure
43
resulted in market power due to oligopoly or even monopoly. Where
realization of efficiencies required market power, scholars argued that
44
policy should tolerate such power.

40. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 71 n.31 (suggesting that, given some departures from
perfect competition, other departures might actually enhance welfare).
41. Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 31, at 32 (“Product differentiation, for example, is often a means
of competition that serves the public by providing minimum assurances of quality and by catering to a
real consumer desire for product improvement or variation.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 117; Alfred
R. Oxenfeldt, Industrial Pricing and Market Practices 88 (1951) (“[Perfect competition] may not
give desirable results in a world characterized by rapidly changing consumer tastes [and] a strong
desire for diversity of products . . . .”); F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance 22 (1970) (describing product differentiation as a potentially beneficial departure from
perfect competition); Frank H. Knight, Demand and Supply and Price, in Second-Year Course in the
Social Sciences: Syllabus and Selected Readings 193, 218 (Harry D. Gideonse et al. eds., 2d
prelim. ed. 1933) (explaining that a seller’s “monopoly” over its own brand is constrained by
competition from other branded goods); Mason, supra note 31, at 47–49 (concluding that economists
should not oppose all instances of product differentiation despite the resulting market power); see also
E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1950, at 85, 92
(“Monopoly elements are built into the economic system and the ideal necessarily involves them. Thus
wherever there is a demand for diversity of product, pure competition turns out to be not the ideal but
a departure from it.”).
42. See Joe S. Bain, Pricing, Distribution, and Employment: Economics of an Enterprise
System 112 (rev. ed. 1953) (“In most industries a very small firm is quite inefficient; as the firm
becomes larger, it tends to become more efficient, reaching a minimum cost per unit of output at some
particular scale.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 8 (“[Real-world competition] may consist in an endeavor
to organize and utilize factors more effectively in producing goods and services, this involving a rivalry
in technological processes as well as in economy in the use and organization of men and materials.”);
Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition: The Economics of a Fully Employed Economy 331–33
(1951); Stigler, supra note 35, at 132–42.
43. See Bain, supra note 42 (“In most industries, a small firm is quite inefficient . . . .”); id. at 153
(concluding that monopolized industries often realize economies of scale and may out-produce
competitive ones); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 5–8; Miller, supra note 31, at 411 (“[I]t would
not be feasible to pulverize industry sufficiently to approximate pure competition . . . without
interfering with the attainment of the optimum scale of plant and rate of operation . . . .”); Edward S.
Mason, Workable Competition Versus Workable Monopoly, in Economic Concentration and the
Monopoly Problem 382, 387 (1957) (“Some power there has to be, both because of inescapable
limitations to the process of atomization and because power is needed to do the job the American
public expects of its industrial machine.”).
44. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 45 (“[I]n so far as reduction of market power is
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Given these benefits of exogenously-driven departures from perfect
competition, price theorists did not view restoring atomistic rivalry of the
sort imagined by the model as a proper goal of antitrust policy. Instead,
price theory implied that antitrust law should further what became
45
known as “workable competition.” Under this approach, conduct
resulting in a departure from perfect competition, and thus market
power, was presumptively “anticompetitive” and therefore, harmful
unless it produced countervailing technological efficiencies or product
46
differentiation that offset such harm. While more “realistic” than
perfect competition, workable competition models continued to embrace
most assumptions of the perfect competition model, including the
assumption that bargaining costs, information costs, opportunism, and
47
externalities are completely absent.
The workable competition approach to antitrust found particular
48
expression in the so-called “Harvard School” of antitrust policy. Indeed,
beginning in the early 1950s, Harvard maintained an interdisciplinary
working group charged with “developing a standard of workable
49
competition” to guide antitrust regulation. In 1959, two participants,
Donald Turner and Carl Kaysen, produced a definitive text aimed at
guiding antitrust law toward the policies required by workable
50
competition. The text argued that market power should render a
incompatible with efficiency and progressiveness, we subordinate the first goal to the second.”); id. at
113 (arguing that monopoly achieved via economies of scale should be beyond antitrust scrutiny); id.
at 133 (arguing that merger creating significant efficiencies should pass scrutiny despite enhancement
of market power); Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies,
82 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1217–25 (1969) (arguing that monopoly achieved via economies of scale should
survive antitrust scrutiny).
45. See J. M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, Am. Econ. Rev., June 1940, at
241, 243 (first articulating the concept of “workable competition” as a guide to antitrust policy).
46. See generally Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 Minn.
L. Rev. 743, 772–93 (2005) (summarizing scholarly literature of the era endorsing this model).
47. See, e.g., Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (“[T]he equality of private and social
costs, especially in the areas relevant to our study, is not a major problem.”); see also Freidrich A.
Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, in Individualism and Economic Order 92, 94 (1948) (“Most
[assumptions of the perfect competition model] are equally assumed in the discussion of the various
‘imperfect’ or ‘monopolistic’ markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic ‘perfections.’”);
Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time, in Coasean
Economics: Law and Economics and the New Institutional Economics 1, 2–3 (Steven G. Medema
ed., 1997) (noting that pioneers of oligopoly theory invoked various assumptions of perfect
competition model). Indeed, George Stigler’s pioneering article on the economics of information
began by noting that “economics” (not “perfect competition”) mostly ignored the question of
information. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213, 213 (1961).
48. See Jacobs, supra note 30, at 227–29 (describing so-called Harvard School of industrial
organization and antitrust policy during this period).
49. Nine Professors Named for Study of Monopoly Problems, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 10,
1950, at 13 (describing Mason’s launch of his five year study); see also Bain, supra note 31, at x
(asserting that Mason created the field of industrial organization); Edward Mason, Preface to Kaysen
& Turner, supra note 31, at xi, xix–xx (1959) (describing origins and workings of the group).
50. See generally Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31; Mason, supra note 49, at xix–xx (explaining
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practice or transaction unlawful absent proof that it would create
technological efficiencies or other benefits, such as product
51
differentiation. In the same year, another member of the group, Joe
Bain, whose work was supported by the same foundation that subsidized
the Harvard group, produced a definitive text on industrial
52
organization. While Bain did not write about antitrust policy per se,
53
Harvard scholars who did often relied upon his work.
The validation of some practices that departed from perfect
competition and created market power rested upon an implicit balance
54
of harms against benefits that assumed the latter predominated. In 1968,
Oliver Williamson would formalize this result at Donald Turner’s behest,
employing price theory’s partial equilibrium trade-off model to
demonstrate that a merger to monopoly that enhanced market power
and produced allocational losses could nonetheless enhance overall
welfare if it resulted in non-trivial technological efficiencies such as
55
economies of scale. Williamson embraced various assumptions of the
workable competition model, including (1) that prices and output before
a merger were in a state of equilibrium; (2) an absence of externalities;
(3) unchanged products; (4) unchanged demand; and (5) that efficiencies
were technological in nature and therefore, other things being equal,
56
manifested in the form of lower prices. These various assumptions, in
what Williamson called a “naïve” model, allowed for definitive
conclusions about the overall impact of two—but only two—
countervailing effects of a transaction, while holding everything else
57
constant, in keeping with the general methodology of price theory.
that this text grew out of Mason’s working group).
51. Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 45, 113.
52. See Bain, supra note 31, at x (describing support by this foundation for research that informed
the text and also formed the basis for a different book).
53. See Turner, supra note 44, at 1211, 1215.
54. See Meese, supra note 46, at 780–83; see also Joe S. Bain, Price Theory 208–09 (1952)
(explaining how efficiencies resulting from large size could offset harm flowing from market power);
Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 77–81 (articulating this approach); id. at 128–29 (contending that a
merger conferring market power could nonetheless enhance welfare on balance by producing “the
appropriate scale of operations”); George J. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, Am. Econ.
Rev., June 1942, at 1, 8–13 (examining the extent to which economies of scale might justify departures
from perfect competition).
55. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, Am.
Econ. Rev., Mar. 1968, at 18 [hereinafter Williamson, Antitrust Defense]; see also Oliver E.
Williamson, Economics and Antitrust Enforcement: Transition Years, Antitrust, Spring 2003, at 61, 64
(explaining the origins of this conclusion).
56. See Williamson, Antitrust Defense, supra note 55, at 21–24; id. at 22 n.4 (“[S]ocial and private
costs are assumed to be identical.”).
57. See Bain, supra note 54, at 14 (explaining that price theory examines the impact of small
changes under the assumption that most variables are fixed); Knight, supra note 35, at 79 (explaining
that perfect competition assumes that all given conditions and factors “remain absolutely
unchanged”); W. Kip Viscusi, et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 74 (2d ed. 1996)
(explaining how partial equilibrium tools assume away complexities such as externalities and
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Williamson’s analysis formalized and legitimated what some
philosophers of science call a paradigm, to wit, a concrete problem
solution, akin to a common law precedent, that a given profession
58
accepts as the basis for further research, often by analogy. This
paradigm naturally informed merger analysis; merger case law and the
59
enforcement guidelines still bear its influence. Moreover, numerous
antitrust scholars subsequently explicitly embraced Williamson’s merger
trade-off analysis as a paradigm to be applied to various other antitrust
60
problems. Indeed, Robert Bork, a founder of the Chicago School of
antitrust analysis, opined that Williamson’s model was properly “used to
61
illustrate all antitrust problems.” Other scholars continued to employ
the trade-off analysis implicitly, by invoking the postulates and policy
prescriptions of the workable competition school and citing Williamson’s
62
article and welfare conclusions with approval.

interactions between industries); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that
workable competition embraces many of the same limiting assumptions as perfect competition).
58. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research,
in The Essential Tension 225, 225–39 (1977) [hereinafter Kuhn, The Essential Tension] (articulating
Kuhn’s original, narrower definition); id. at 229 (“[Text]books exhibit concrete problem solutions that
the profession has come to accept as paradigms, and they then ask the student . . . to solve for himself
problems very closely related in both method and substance to those through which the textbook or
accompanying lecture has led him. Nothing could be better calculated to produce ‘mental sets’ or
Einstellungen.”); id. at 233 (describing basic research in the sciences in the same way); Thomas S.
Kuhn, Preface to Essential Tension supra, at ix, xvii–xx (articulating this definition and recognizing
that the definition of the concept was expanded in Scientific Revolutions to refer to the set of values
and pre-commitments shared by a particular scientific community); Thomas S. Kuhn, Second
Thoughts on Paradigms, in Essential Tension, supra, at 293, 294–308; 2 Thomas S. Kuhn,
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 23 (2d
ed. 1970) [hereinafter Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions] (“In a science, on the other hand, a paradigm is
rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an
object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions.”); Wolfgang
Stegmüller, The Structure and Dynamics of Theories 177–80 (1976).
59. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 Antitrust L.J. 207 (2003) (describing the
role of Williamson’s trade-off model in enforcement policy).
60. Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 107–10 (Free Press
1993) (1978) (arguing that Williamson’s trade-off model can be used to illustrate all antitrust
problems); Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, Am. Econ. Rev.,
May 1969, at 105, 105 (“The emphasis throughout [this article] is on mergers, but much of the
argument generalizes easily.”); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern
Industrial Organization 798–99 (2d ed. 1994) (relying upon the Williamson model to illustrate
efficiency-based antitrust policy); Viscusi et al., supra note 57, at 124–25 (agreeing with Bork that a
partial equilibrium “diagram can be used to illustrate all antitrust problems”); Thomas C. Arthur, The
Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 15–18
(1994) (invoking Williamson’s model to illustrate the trade-off between market power and efficiencies
when analyzing trade restraints); Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand “Cartels” Under GTE Sylvania,
30 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (1982) (employing the model to illustrate a “consumer welfare” standard
applicable to all antitrust problems).
61. See Bork, supra note 60, at 108.
62. See, e.g., 2 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of
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Non-standard contracts, such as tying, exclusive dealing, exclusive
territories, or complete vertical integration, did not fare well within
either the workable competition model or the trade-off paradigm that
informed it. Such agreements offended two postulates of perfect
competition. First, these contracts limited rivalry between the parties to
63
them, or between these parties and third parties. Second, given the
nature of contract—to restrain—such agreements interfered with the
64
movement of resources from one user to the other. Thus, such
agreements contravened perfect competition’s assumed absence of
“obstacles to the making, execution, and changing of plans at will” and
“‘perfect mobility’ in all economic adjustments, with no cost involved in
65
movements or changes.”
These departures from perfect competition did not, according to
price theorists, produce offsetting benefits. Such agreements interfered
with the discretion of trading partners before firms took title to inputs, or
after title to output passed to consumers. Thus, such agreements could
not create technological efficiencies such as economies of scale, which by
their nature arose within a firm, in connection with the manufacturing
66
process. For the same reason, such agreements could not alter or
enhance the quality of the products they governed. Moreover, scholars of
the era habitually assumed a well-functioning legal system, including
well-defined property rights that minimized the prospect that private

Antitrust Principles and Their Application, ¶ 408a, at 292 n.1 (1978) (invoking Williamson’s
conclusions in support of tolerance for concentration and resulting scale economies); Timothy J.
Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 381 (1980)
(relying upon Williamson’s conclusion to justify an efficiency defense in the merger context).
63. Cf. Knight, supra note 35, at 77–78 (noting that perfect competition requires absence of
cooperation between individuals that are potential rivals); Stigler, supra note 34, at 14 (“[I]t seems
essential to assume the absence of collusion as a supplement to the presence of large numbers.”).
64. Cf. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“To bind, to restrain is of
[the] very essence [of contracts].”).
65. Knight, supra note 35, at 77–78; see also Stigler, supra note 35, at 21 (explaining that perfect
competition assumes that “markets are free from special institutional restraints” and that “prices and
the mobility of resources are not restricted”).
66. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism 370–71 (1985) (explaining
how price theory treated efficiencies as technological in nature and thus as arising “within” the firm).
Complete vertical integration constituted a partial exception to the generalizations offered here, since
such integration could conceivably create technological efficiencies. See Bain, supra note 31, at 356–57
(describing possible technological benefits of vertical integration); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at
128–29 (explaining that merger can alter the extent of vertical integration to account for technological
changes). Still, scholars assumed that most such integration enhanced market power. See Bain, supra
note 31, at 357–58 (“[T]here is a good deal of vertical integration which, although not actually
uneconomical, is also not justified on the basis of any cost savings. This is apparently true in particular
of the integration of distributive facilities by manufacturing firms, where in most cases the rational of
the integration is most evidently the increase of the market power of the firms involved rather than a
reduction in cost.”); Stigler, supra note 54, at 22 (“Such economies are historical: technological
progress merely leads to a redefinition of the scope of the production process. But it is arguable that
most of the important advantages of vertical integration partake of a monopolistic nature.”).
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costs could diverge from social costs. This legal framework was
exogenous to the economic market; economic actors took it as a given
and could not change it, just as they took for granted the sort of scientific
and engineering considerations that determined the shape of production
68
functions, the mathematical relationships between inputs and outputs.
Scholars also assumed, somewhat curiously, that parties did not behave
in an opportunistic fashion, thereby precluding recognition that such
69
restraints could overcome such opportunism. Because such restraints
restricted rivalry, and interfered with the mobility of resources while
producing no corresponding technological benefits, economists naturally
inferred that they reflected an exercise of market power to the detriment
70
of consumers and the rest of society. There were, moreover, no apparent
efficiencies that might offset these harms. Given these assumptions,
application of the trade-off paradigm easily required condemnation of
such agreements.
For over three decades, price theory and its workable competition
model informed antitrust policy, giving rise to the “inhospitality tradition”
71
of antitrust. During this era, courts found numerous practices
unreasonable per se, reasoning that such practices always, or almost
always, were anticompetitive and always, or almost always, lacked
72
redeeming virtues. Price-fixing, whether horizontal or vertical, maximum
67. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (“[T]he equality of private and social costs,
especially in the areas relevant to our study, is not a major problem.”); Pigou, supra note 38, at 127–30
(explaining that a competitive economic system depends upon well-functioning property and contract
rights).
68. See Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of Perfect
Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 21, 69–70 (2005) (explaining how the
perfect competition model assumed fixed property rights and other background rules of law that
parties could not change by contract); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text (collecting
authorities for the proposition that the shape of production functions depends upon exogenous
scientific and engineering considerations).
69. See, e.g., Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested
Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 1993, at 83, 84 (1993)
(contending that price theory and perfect competition rested upon an assumption that market actors
behaved as “Victorian gentlemen”); Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, Perfect Competition and
the Creativity of the Market, 39 J. Econ. Literature 479, 490–91 (2001) (detailing the tendency of some
devotees of perfect competition to assume away the possibility of opportunism by fiat).
70. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing that behavior different from that predicted
by the perfect competition model reflects the exercise of market power).
71. See Meese, supra note 29, at 124–34 (detailing the influence of price theory on antitrust
doctrine during this period and the resulting inhospitality tradition). The phrase “inhospitality
tradition” was coined by Donald Turner, a Harvard economist and lawyer who headed the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice during the Johnson Administration. Donald F. Turner, Some
Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. St. B. Ass’n Antitrust L. Symp. 1, 1–2. Turner “approach[ed]
territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in
the tradition of antitrust law.” Id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 30, at 227–29 (describing the Harvard
School of antitrust policy).
72. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1958) (articulating and applying
this test to tying agreements).

Meese_62-HLJ-457.doc (Do Not Delete)

474

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/7/2011 12:18 PM

[Vol. 62:457

or minimum, failed this test, regardless of defendants’ position in the
73
marketplace. Other horizontal limitations on rivalry were unlawful per se,
74
even when ancillary to legitimate ventures. Tying contracts and exclusive
dealing fared slightly better. Tying was “only” unlawful per se when the
seller of the tying product possessed “economic power,” which courts
75
found in any departure from perfect competition. Exclusive dealing
contracts were unlawful whenever they “foreclosed” a non-trivial share of
the relevant market, regardless of whether they created any offsetting
76
benefits. The Federal Trade Commission went even further, with the
blessing of the Supreme Court, banning as “unfair trade practices”
77
exclusive dealing agreements that foreclosed one percent of the market.
Finally, complete vertical integration by merger was unlawful whenever
the transaction “foreclosed” rivals from a non-trivial portion of the
78
market. Such transactions, it was said, created a “clog on competition,”
79
with competition defined as moment-by-moment rivalry.
At the same time, so-called unilateral conduct was almost always
80
lawful per se. Such behavior included charging a high price, realizing
economies of scale, devising new products, as well as advertising and
81
promoting those products. Moreover, courts expressly held that
82
successful product differentiation did not violate Sherman Act § 2,
83
despite any resulting market power. Nearly all of these practices could
injure rivals and perhaps drive them from the market, to the detriment of
consumers in some cases. Nonetheless, courts treated such conduct as
“competition on the merits,” beyond scrutiny under either § 1 or § 2 of
73. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152–53 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
74. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606–13 (1972) (banning contractuallyimposed exclusive territories ancillary to valid venture); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357–
58 (1967) (same).
75. See N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6; see also Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503–
04 (1969) (finding that the existence of tying contracts creates a presumption that agreements are
imposed via market power); United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (possession of
copyright creates presumption of economic power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that ownership of attractive trademarks established “economic power”).
76. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949) (holding exclusive
dealing contracts necessarily “substantially lessen[ed] competition” where manufacturer bound 6.7%
of region’s dealers); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff’d,
343 U.S. 922 (1952) (finding exclusive dealing contract that bound three percent of a region’s dealers
unlawful).
77. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (“[Such agreements] obviously conflict[]
with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act.”).
78. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323–24 (1962).
79. See id. at 324 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 337 U.S. at 314).
80. Meese, supra note 46, at 797–808.
81. Id. at 801–04.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
83. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1956) (finding that
product differentiation confers slight monopoly power but does not offend § 2).
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the Sherman Act, even when practiced by a monopolist. Harvard
scholars advocated and praised these results, concluding that such
conduct was consistent with workable competition, because the benefits
85
of such conduct would more than counteract any harm. This result
86
flowed naturally from the partial equilibrium trade-off analysis.
B. The Collapse of the Inhospitality Tradition and a New Rule of
Reason
More than three decades ago, in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania,
the Supreme Court abandoned its hostility to non-standard agreements,
holding that certain non-price vertical restraints should be analyzed
87
under the rule of reason. The Sylvania Court acknowledged that such
restraints reduced rivalry between dealers selling the manufacturer’s
88
product. Nonetheless, the Court reversed the per se ban on such
agreements, relying upon reasoning derived from “transaction cost
economics,” a self-described rival to price theory that revolutionized
89
economists’ interpretation of non-standard contracts. While the Court
recognized that such restraints were departures from “pure
competition,” it concluded that they could produce countervailing
benefits, albeit not the sort of technological efficiencies recognized by the
90
workable competition model. In particular, the Court noted that such
restraints could allow dealers to recoup the benefits of their investments

84. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347
U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam); see also Meese, supra note 46, at 793–808.
85. See 3 Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Principles and
Their Application ¶ 626b (1978) (contending that § 2 of the Sherman Act should not ban conduct
producing the “economic results associated with workable competition”); Kaysen & Turner, supra
note 31, at 44, 268; id. at 22 (“[T]he Sherman Act has been interpreted—and properly, we think—to
leave room for legal monopolies, that is, for monopolies acquired solely by competitive merit.”
(emphasis added)).
86. See Oliver E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure
Considerations, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1525 (1972) (“The dominant firm charged with a violation
would be able to rebut the presumption of unlawful monopolization by demonstrating that its
dominance was the result of economies of scale leading to a natural monopoly, of the exercise of an
unexpired patent or of continuing, indivisible, absolute management superiority.” (footnote omitted)).
87. See 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
88. See id. at 54 (“[V]ertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition . . . .”).
89. See id. at 51–57; see also Williamson, supra note 66, at 372 (explaining how the Sylvania
decision reflected advances in economic theory produced by TCE); Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting
Antitrust, 76 Geo L.J. 271, 274 (1987) [hereinafter Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust] (contending that
TCE was the manifestation of a “genuine scientific revolution”); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics
of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1440–47 (1974) [hereinafter
Williamson, Economics of Antitrust] (comparing “received microtheory” and “transaction cost”
approaches to industrial organization).
90. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51–57; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (explaining how Sylvania held that restriction on competition in one portion of
the market could enhance overall competition).
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in promotional activities and thereby ensure adequate downstream
91
promotion of the manufacturer’s product.
Subsequent decisions invoked Sylvania to repudiate per se rules
92
against other vertical restraints. The Court has also held that certain
horizontal restraints once deemed unlawful per se should instead be
93
analyzed under the rule of reason. Lower courts have extrapolated from
these and other decisions and subjected numerous horizontal restraints
94
that were once unlawful per se to rule of reason analysis.
The repudiation of various per se rules required courts and agencies
to articulate a methodology for evaluating such restraints under the rule
95
of reason. For nearly a century, the goal of such an analysis has been
clear: Determine whether a challenged restraint produces the
“consequences of monopoly,” namely, increased market power
96
manifesting itself as higher prices, reduced output, or lower quality. If
courts were omniscient planners, they could directly discern whether, in
fact, a restraint enhanced parties’ ability profitably to reduce output and
97
thus raise price above cost—the definition of market power. Antitrust
law, however, is a costly administrative system that cannot replicate the
98
conclusions of a perfectly-informed economist. Thus, courts and
agencies conducting rule of reason analysis have developed certain
shortcuts or proxies for determining whether, in fact, a restraint enhances
the market power of the parties to it, to the detriment of consumers.
Both courts and agencies have agreed on certain principles. First,
where a restraint expressly sets price or output, the mere existence of the
agreement establishes a prima facie case, regardless of whether the
91. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55–56 (opining that intrabrand restraints could improve upon a
“purely competitive situation” by eliminating “free rider effect” and citing work of Richard Posner
and Robert Bork for the proposition that non-price intrabrand restraints can eliminate “free riding”
that would occur if manufacturers relied upon unfettered dealer rivalry for product distribution).
92. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (reversing the
per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance).
93. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (analyzing a horizontal agreement limiting
advertising related to price and quality under the rule of reason); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99–104
(articulating rationale for analyzing restraint on price and output under the rule of reason).
94. See generally Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
horizontal restriction on output of broadcast games should be analyzed under a full-blown rule of
reason); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that horizontal
agreement depriving a rival of access to important input will be analyzed under the rule of reason);
Rothery Storage & Van Co., v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that a
horizontal agreement on minimum prices could produce cognizable benefits and was thus properly
analyzed under the rule of reason); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a horizontal agreement on product offerings could produce cognizable benefits and was
thus properly analyzed under the rule of reason).
95. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103–20 (conducting rule of reason analysis after rejecting per se
condemnation of a challenged horizontal restraint on price and output).
96. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
97. See Carlton & Perloff, supra note 60, at 137–38.
98. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.).
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99

defendant possesses market power. These courts and agencies believe
that such explicit restraints “obviously” or “evidently” enhance market
100
power, to the detriment of consumers. This result, it is said, flows from
101
“rudimentary economics.”
Second, where less explicit restraints are concerned, courts and
agencies find a prima facie case whenever a restraint causes “actual
detrimental effects” in the form of higher price, reduced output, or
reduced quality, again regardless whether the defendant possesses
102
market power. Whether a restraint actually results in “higher” prices,
or reduced output, raises the question: “Compared to what?” Courts
applying this test have employed three different baselines for comparison
with the prices or output produced by a restraint. Some take a temporal
approach, comparing the price, output or quality produced by the
103
restraint to what defendants actually offered before the restraint.
Others compare the price produced by the restraint to the price
simultaneously charged by firms in other markets not employing such

99. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999) (explaining that, in some cases, a
mere restriction on price or output can suffice to establish a prima facie case); United States v. Brown
Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 673–74 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying this approach to a horizontal interbrand restraint);
Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors § 3.3 (2000)
[hereinafter AGCC] (noting that the character of the agreement, without more, can give rise to a
prima facie case); see also Chi. Prof’l Sports, 961 F.2d at 674–76 (finding that proof of express output
limitation itself established prima facie case).
100. See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 769–70; AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.3 (noting that the
character of the agreement can give rise to a prima facie case); cf. FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 (1990) (citing Bork, supra note 60, at 269) (contending that the existence
of a price fixing agreement suggests that the parties to the agreement believe they possess market
power).
101. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 757, 770 (invoking “rudimentary economics” to justify this
approach); see NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984) (quoting a
pamphlet by Professor Areeda for the proposition that in some cases, restraints are so obviously
anticompetitive that rule of reason analysis “can be applied in the twinkling of an eye” (quoting
Phillip Areeda, Fed. Judicial Ctr., The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues
37–38 (1981))).
102. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (rejecting defendants’
contention that market definition and proof of market power were necessary elements of a rule of
reason case); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–09 (1984); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.2, at 8 (“Agreements of a
type that always or almost always tends to raise price or reduce output are per se illegal.”); id. § 1.2, at
4 (“The central question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the
ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service or innovation
below what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.” (emphasis added)); see also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 256
n.25 (2d ed. 1999) (“Detrimental effects include observed decreases in output, an observed increase in
price coordination, or exclusion from the market of firms that seem to be competitive entrants.”); cf.
Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that proof of market
power is a necessary ingredient of any rule of reason claim).
103. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020–21 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff established
a prima facie case by showing that prices for the services governed by the restraint changed after the
restraint); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.35, at 22 n.50 (discussing a temporal approach).
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104

restraints. Still others perform a sort of “thought experiment,” asking
whether removal of the restraint would result in lower prices or higher
output, thereby employing a hypothetical non-restraint equilibrium as a
baseline for comparison to the prices and output produced by the
105
restraint. These approaches are not mutually exclusive—some courts
106
have relied upon more than one.
Each approach used to discern whether there is a prima facie case
imagines two worlds: one in which defendants have adopted the restraint
107
and one in which the restraint is removed. In this way, both decisional
law and enforcement guidelines identify baselines against which to
measure the impact of the restraint. These baselines, in turn, constitute
108
alternative equilibria to those produced by the restraint. According to
judges and agencies, any price increase (or reduction in output or
quality) compared to such baselines necessarily reflects a collective
exercise of market power enabled by the restraint, therefore rendering
109
any additional inquiry into market power superfluous. This supposed

104. See, e.g., Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 455–57 (recounting evidence that terms were more
favorable to consumers in localities without restraints); United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229,
241 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding the fact that defendants offered more products in foreign markets not
governed by the restraint than they did domestically relevant to finding that restraints reduced
“product innovation and output”).
105. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–09 (invoking the finding by the trial court that but for restraint,
prices would be lower and output higher); Visa, 344 F.3d at 240–41 (finding that removal of the
restraint “would” result in greater and more diverse product offerings). The characterization here of
NCAA as relying upon a “thought experiment,” as opposed to actual proof of anticompetitive harm, is
likely controversial. Indeed, leading scholars such as Professor Areeda contended that the NCAA
opinion rested upon proof of actual anticompetitive harm. See 7 Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law:
An Analysis of Principles and Their Application ¶ 1511, at 430–33 (1986). However, a close
reading of the Court’s decision confirms that the Court cited no evidence of tangible harm. The Court
relied heavily upon the trial court’s conjecture that removal of the restraints “would” have resulted in
higher output and lower prices. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106 n.30 (quoting findings of the district
court that, absent the challenged restraints, prices and output “would” be different). Indeed, the
NCAA first imposed the restraints decades before the litigation. Id. at 89–90. Thus the district court’s
findings were purely conjectural, in that the court merely hypothesized what would occur if the league
removed the restraints.
106. See Visa, 344 F.3d at 240–41 (relying upon the second and third approach to find that plaintiff
had established a prima facie case).
107. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 105–08 (affirming trial court’s finding of a prima facie case by asking
whether prices would be higher or lower absent the restraint); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.1 (“Rule of
reason analysis focuses on the state of competition with, as compared to without, the relevant
agreement.”).
108. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–08 (finding that the restraint foreclosed competition because it
raised prices and lowered output more than would be expected in a competitive market); AGCC,
supra note 99, § 3.1 (explaining that rule of reason analysis determines whether an agreement
enhances or reduces output when compared to “the absence of the relevant agreement”).
109. See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61 (“Since the purpose of the inquiries into market
definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine
adverse effects on competition, ‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction in output,’ can
obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’”
(quoting 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511, at 429)); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.3, at 11 n.28 (quoting
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exercise of market power constitutes “anticompetitive harm,” and
reflects an economic state of affairs inferior to that which would occur
110
without the restraint. Leading scholars, particularly those from the
Harvard School, have endorsed this approach and the reasoning behind
111
it.
A prima facie case does not itself establish liability: a defendant can
still seek to avoid this fate by adducing proof that the restraint produces
112
significant benefits that offset any harm. However, Supreme Court
decisions and enforcement guidelines provide that evidence purporting
to rebut such a case is only cognizable if it tends to show that the
restraint results in lower prices for the defendants’ product, or at least
does not raise those prices, as compared to the prices that would occur
113
without the restraint. That is, courts and agencies assume that a
purported “benefit” that results in higher prices necessarily reflects an
exercise of market power and thus simply confirms the initial
114
presumption that the restraint produces anticompetitive harm. Finally,
once defendants adduce evidence of significant benefits, courts and
agencies assume that these benefits coexist with anticompetitive effects,
115
irrebuttably presumed once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.

Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61, for the proposition that proof of increased prices obviates
the need for market power assessment and stating that agencies will only gather information necessary
to determine the impact of a restraint); see also Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[A]n actual adverse effect on competition arguably is more direct evidence of market power than
calculations of elusive market share figures.”).
110. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–09; AGCC, supra note 99, §§ 3.1, 3.3.
111. See 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511; Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at 256; Lawrence A.
Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook 210–12 (2000)
(approving NCAA’s rejection of market power inquiry given proof of increased prices). To be sure,
Professor Areeda opined that “plaintiff must ordinarily allege and prove the market that is allegedly
restrained and that the defendants occupy a sufficient role in that market to impair competition
there.” 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1507b, at 397. He did not, however, suggest that proof of market
power was legally necessary, but instead claimed that plaintiffs would have difficulty proving
detrimental effects and would thus turn to proof of market power as a surrogate for such effects. See
id. ¶ 1503, at 376; see also infra notes 122–27 and accompanying text (elaborating on Professor
Areeda’s position).
112. See United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 243–44 (2d Cir. 2003) (evaluating proffered
benefits after plaintiff established a prima facie case); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021–24 (10th Cir.
1998) (considering several such justifications).
113. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113–14 (finding the purported benefit not cognizable where the trial
court found that the challenged restraint caused defendants’ prices to rise); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (holding defendants’ claim that restraint enhanced quality by
preventing competitive bidding rested on an assumption that restraint produced higher prices and thus
was not cognizable); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.3 (stating that potential benefits will only give rise to
rule of reason analysis if they “could” offset anticompetitive harm by reducing prices or preventing
price increases).
114. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114; Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693; see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Competitor Collaboration after California Dental Association, 2000 U. Chi. Legal F.
149, 179 (contending that restraints imposed in NCAA were necessarily the result of market power).
115. See Meese, supra note 29, at 162 (explaining how the current approach to comparing costs and
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This assumption underlies the requirement that decisionmakers
116
“balance” benefits against harms. Given this “coexistence assumption,”
“mere” proof that the restraint results in lower prices does not entitle the
defendant to judgment. Instead, the restraint is still unlawful if the
defendant could achieve the same benefits by means of a less restrictive
117
alternative. This less restrictive alternative test helps courts avoid
actually balancing a restraint’s benefits against harms. At the same time,
the test rests upon the assumption that any benefits produced by the
restraint necessarily coexist with harms that the restraint purportedly
118
produces. Absent this assumption, there is simply no reason to assume
that the restraint is “restrictive,” or to ask whether there is a less
restrictive means of achieving the same benefits.
The mode of rule of reason analysis just described dovetails nicely
with the price-theoretic partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm that
animated the workable competition model and the inhospitality era and
still informs the analysis of horizontal mergers and monopolies by courts
119
and agencies. Like the partial equilibrium model, modern analysis
begins with an implicit baseline—the price, output, and quality that exists
before or without the restraint. This partial equilibrium baseline, in turn,
is an equilibrium—a steady state of affairs—and is also free of
externalities. Proof that a restraint produces “actual detrimental effects”
benefits rests upon assumption that two effects coexist). But cf. United States v. Brown Univ.,
5 F.3d 658, 674 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a lack of evidence of tangible harm lightens defendant’s
burden of articulating benefits).
116. See AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.37 (providing that the decisionmaker must determine whether
efficiencies prevent price increases); id. § 3.3 (explaining that overriding benefits must “offset
anticompetitive harms”); see also Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Ass’n, 996 F.2d 537, 543
(2d Cir. 1993) (“Ultimately [under the rule of reason], it remains for the factfinder to weigh the harms
and benefits of the challenged behavior.”); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589,
595 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he most careful weighing of alleged dangers and potential benefits [is] the
normal treatment afforded by the rule of reason.”).
117. See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (explaining that once defendant proves benefits, plaintiff can
prevail by showing that “those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner”);
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 679; Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.36(b) (“[I]f the
participants could have achieved or could achieve similar efficiencies by practical, significantly less
restrictive means, then the Agencies conclude that the relevant agreement is not reasonably necessary
to their achievement.”); 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶¶ 1505b, 1507b; Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at
257 (endorsing this test for evaluating horizontal ancillary restraints); id. at 487–89 (endorsing this test
for vertical distribution restraints); Stephen F. Ross, Principles of Antitrust Law 157–58 (1993)
(ancillary restraint should be unlawful if “broader than necessary to achieve [its] purpose”); Sullivan
& Grimes, supra note 111, at 223 (endorsing this test for horizontal restraints); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,
Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 35 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 871, 930 (1994) (endorsing this test for restraints ancillary to joint ventures).
118. See Meese, supra note 29, at 167–69 (explaining that a “less restrictive alternative test” rests
upon the assumption that the restraint’s benefits coexist with harms).
119. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (detailing the influence of the partial equilibrium
trade-off model upon inhospitality era of antitrust); supra note 59 and accompanying text (detailing
the influence of the partial equilibrium trade-off model on modern merger law and enforcement
guidelines).
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compared to this often hypothesized baseline is analogous to proof that,
say, a merger to monopoly confers market power on the new entity when
120
compared to the pre-merger equilibrium state of affairs. Moreover, the
assumption that benefits manifest themselves in the form of lower prices
as compared to the pre-restraint equilibrium reflects the model’s
assumption that efficiencies are technological in nature and reduce
(historical) production costs, when everything else is held constant.
Finally, the requirement that fact-finders “balance” any benefits against
harms, as in the merger context, reflects the model’s assumption that
121
harms and benefits coexist.
As noted above, leading scholars have endorsed the dominant
approach to rule of reason analysis. Most notably, the modern era’s most
influential antitrust scholar, the late Phillip Areeda of Harvard Law
School, embraced the approach described above “hook, line and sinker.”
One might even say that Professor Areeda invented the approach. In
1981 and perhaps earlier, Areeda prepared a course for the Federal
Judicial Center’s “Education and Training Series” for judges on the
122
methodology of rule of reason analysis. The pamphlet prepared for the
course was, Professor Areeda said, adopted from forthcoming volume six
of the author’s massive and influential treatise, the first five volumes of
which were co-authored with Donald Turner, a co-founder of the
123
Harvard School of antitrust. The pamphlet anticipated the elements of
124
the rule of reason analysis described above. Moreover, just three years
later, the Supreme Court quoted the document at length for the
proposition that a court could conduct rule of reason analysis without
125
determining whether the defendants possessed market power. In 1986,
the Court quoted volume seven of the treatise, this time for the
proposition that proof of “actual detrimental effects” would establish a
prima facie case, thereby obviating the need for inquiry into market
power, which was itself (supposedly) simply a surrogate for such
126
Professor Areeda himself endorsed the rule of reason
effects.

120. See Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1–3 (2010)
[hereinafter Joint Merger Guidelines] (detailing standards governing determination of
concentration, anticompetitive effects, and prospect of entry).
121. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining how many treated the trade-off
paradigm as a key tool for solving antitrust problems); see also Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note
120, at 2–4 (articulating this approach to analyzing mergers).
122. See Phillip E. Areeda, Fed. Judicial Ctr., The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Analysis:
General Issues 37–38 (1981).
123. In fact, the substance of the pamphlet did not appear until volume seven of the treatise, which
appeared in 1986. See 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511, at 433 n.22 (referring to 1981 work as an
“earlier version” of this treatise chapter).
124. See id. ¶ 1438b, at 8–10 (discussing less restrictive alternative test); id. ¶ 1441e–14441h, at 37–
38, 41–42 (discussing a truncated rule of reason).
125. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 n.39 (1984).
126. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (“Since the purpose of the
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methodology announced in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahoma, and several lower courts have cited his treatise to support
127
the dominant method of rule of reason analysis outlined above.
Professor Areeda, of course, was heir to the Harvard School of
antitrust started by Edward Mason, Donald Turner, and Joe Bain during
the early 1950s, while Areeda was a student at Harvard Law School.
Beginning in 1975, Areeda and Turner co-authored numerous articles in
the Harvard Law Review, as well as the first five volumes of the treatise.
This work, the most influential antitrust scholarship of the twentieth
128
century, acknowledged one intellectual debt—to Richard Caves, who
129
had opined that industrial organization was “applied price theory.”
Moreover, the work assumed that the purpose of antitrust law was to
130
achieve the “economic results associated with workable competition.”
Finally, these scholars argued that “externalities” resulting from
“transaction costs . . . do not imply any material alteration of antitrust
policy,” but that, instead, governments should eliminate such market
131
failures via regulation. It should come as no surprise, then, that this
leader of the Harvard School would endorse an approach to rule of
reason analysis reflecting workable competition’s partial equilibrium
trade-off model and its numerous limiting assumptions.
Despite its apparent precision, the dominant method of rule of
reason analysis seems to produce various anomalies, that is, observations

inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, ‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a
reduction of output,’ can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate
for detrimental effects.’” (quoting 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511 at 429)).
127. See 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511 (discussing and endorsing NCAA); see also, e.g., Law v.
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing the treatise for the less restrictive alternative test);
SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brown Univ.,
5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993); Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Ass’n, 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d
Cir. 1993).
128. According to Justice Breyer, Supreme Court advocates would rather cite two paragraphs of
this treatise than the holdings of four courts of appeals and the opinions of three Supreme Court
Justices. See Langdell’s West Wing Renamed in Honor of Areeda, Harv. U. Gazette (Apr. 25, 1996),
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/1996/04.25/LangdellsWestWi.html.
129. See 1 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Principles
and Their Application, at xvii (1978); see also Caves, supra note 32, at 14 (“The subject of ‘industrial
organization’ applies the economist’s models of price theory to the industries in the world around
us.”).
130. 3 Areeda & Turner, supra note 85, at 77 (“[Antitrust law] seeks to protect the process of
competition on the merits and the economic results associated with workable competition.” (emphasis
added)).
131. 2 Areeda & Turner, supra note 62, at 316. The authors did recognize “only one respect in
which externalities have implications for antitrust policy,” that is, collaboration to avoid what they
called “low private-cost but high social-cost method[s] of production.” Id. at 317. The authors
concluded that courts should not automatically condemn such collaborations as anticompetitive. Id.;
see also Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 13 n.12 (same); id. at 67 n.25 (“[E]quality of private and
social costs, especially in the areas relevant to our study, is not a major problem.”).
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or results inconsistent with those predicted or allowed by the dominant
132
paradigm. For one thing, the method of analysis seems to preclude any
real opportunity to show that a restraint produces significant benefits. As
already noted, parties generally establish a prima facie case by showing
that the restraint in question results in “actual detrimental effects” by
133
increasing prices or reducing output. While defendants may supposedly
offer evidence of benefits in rebuttal, such evidence must tend to show
134
that prices fell or did not rise because of the restraint. Indeed,
purported benefits are not even cognizable unless they satisfy this
135
criterion. This opportunity to rebut the prima facie case seems illusory,
however, given that the fact-finder has already determined that the
restraint produces higher prices and/or reduced output. To be sure, the
defendant is always free to prove that his prices did not, in fact, rise after
136
or because of the restraint. Still, such proof does not rest upon any
proof of efficiencies, but instead simply counteracts the prima facie case
of harm. Absent such proof, any effort to rebut such a case simply by
demonstrating efficiencies will fail.
Moreover, the assertion that benefits must manifest themselves as
reduced prices runs counter to other statements in Supreme Court
decisions that pro-competitive effects may manifest themselves as higher
137
prices. For instance, the Supreme Court has twice held that evidence
tending to show that a manufacturer desires higher resale prices is
consistent with a pro-competitive account of challenged restraints and
138
therefore cannot, without more, justify per se condemnation.
Moreover, in NCAA, the Supreme Court indicated that members of an
amateur sports league could agree to place a ceiling on the compensation
paid to student athletes without incurring per se liability, even though the
whole point of such restraints is to produce wages lower than
139
competition would produce in a “free market.” Finally, the canonical
example of a “reasonable” restraint—the narrowly-tailored covenant
ancillary to the sale of a business—will, if successful, result in prices that

132. See generally Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 60–65 (defining anomalies in
this way).
133. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984).
134. Id.
135. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–95 (1978).
136. Cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209, 278 nn.216–17 (1986) (suggesting that much
evidence of benefits tends to show the absence of market power harm in the first place).
137. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984).
138. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1988) (finding that “price
cutting is frequently made possible by ‘free riding’ on the services provided by other dealers,” and that
the manufacturer’s concern about price cutting is consistent with a beneficial account of the restraint);
see also Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762–63 (same); Meese, supra note 29, at 151–52.
139. See 468 U.S. at 103 (stating that contractual restrictions on horizontal rivalry were necessary
to enable the NCAA to differentiate its product from minor league sports).
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are higher and/or output that is lower than it would otherwise be,
thereby allowing the party that sought the covenant to reap the fruits of
its investment. A covenant that did not have such an effect would seem
140
worthless, and yet courts have repeatedly enforced such agreements.
Perhaps sensing something is amiss, some lower courts have
adjusted or ignored the dominant test when evaluating restraints they
believe may be pro-competitive. For instance, some courts describe the
proffer of evidence of efficiencies without stating that such efficiencies
141
must result in lower prices or higher output. Others carve out
exceptions from the dominant test, or ignore it altogether. In Chicago
Professional Sports Ltd. v. NBA, for instance, the Seventh Circuit
initially affirmed a preliminary injunction against the NBA’s limit on the
number of games an individual team could broadcast, holding that the
142
explicit restraint established a prima facie case. Later in the litigation,
the court reversed course, holding that proof of market power would be
an essential element of the plaintiff’s case at trial, even though no one
143
disputed that the restraint reduced the output of televised games. The
court distinguished Supreme Court precedent by claiming that the NBA
reflected greater economic integration than entities previously accorded
greater scrutiny, a factor the NCAA Court did not mention as relevant to
144
its analysis. Other decisions have ignored the test altogether, holding
that plaintiffs must establish that defendants possess “market power” in a
145
properly defined market to establish a prima facie case. These courts
have recognized, at least implicitly, that straightforward application of
current law may condemn restraints that in fact produce benefits without
any offsetting harm. At the same time, none of these decisions has
confronted the possible conflict between their conclusions and the
146
Supreme Court’s price and output test.

140. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688–89 (discussing such agreements as
quintessential reasonable restraints under § 1 of the Sherman Act); United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); see also United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 568–71 (1898) (noting that such restraints are “indirect” and thus not
unlawful under § 1).
141. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993).
142. See 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992).
143. See id. at 599–601.
144. Id. at 599–600.
145. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 217–21 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985).
146. See, e.g., Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 216–23 (finding that the challenged restraint produced
benefits by increasing promotional expenditures and enhancing demand, without considering the
possibility that prices rose as a result).
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II. Ronald Coase and the Transaction Cost Revolution
As noted earlier, courts and agencies were once hostile to nonstandard agreements, because they departed from perfect competition
without any apparent countervailing benefits in the form of product
147
differentiation or technological efficiencies. Courts began reversing this
hostility three decades ago, eventually declaring that many such
restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason, despite their
148
impact on rivalry. This revised treatment followed naturally from the
TCE revolution in economic theory, which undermined the workable
competition paradigm and offered various beneficial explanations for
149
complete and partial integration.
This Part details the origins and course of the TCE revolution,
beginning with a description of the perfect competition model. This
model, of course, served as the foundation for price theory and its
workable competition model, including the partial equilibrium trade-off
150
model and the concomitant price/output baseline. As shown below, the
model also served as the starting point for Ronald Coase’s pathbreaking
explanation for the existence of the business firm, the most ubiquitous
non-standard contract. Coase’s approach, it is shown, was premised upon
the recognition of antecedent and exogenous, but minor departures from
perfect competition that give rise to transaction costs and efforts by
rational market participants to reduce such costs. This Part will focus
particularly on the evolving definition of “transaction costs” that
economists extending Coase’s classic case of integration have identified,
costs that help explain partial integration, which Coase did not explore in
his published work. This Part also contends that transaction costs are
usefully divided into two categories that reflect different sorts of
departures from perfect and often workable competition: technological
transaction costs and non-technological transaction costs. The former,
which Coase emphasized in his revolutionary work, entail haggling and
gathering information and are closely analogous to engineering-based
production costs always recognized by the perfect competition model
and price theory more generally. Given this close analogy, the partial
equilibrium trade-off model readily incorporates the reduction of such
costs into its methodology for determining the impact of trade restraints.
As a result, Coase’s work did not by itself seem to call into question
either the usefulness of the trade-off model or the dominant approach
for analyzing trade restraints and transactions. The latter, nontechnological costs, which represent extensions of Coase’s classic case,

147.
148.
149.
150.

See supra notes 46, 63–70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89–94, 176–98, 228–73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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result from more fundamental departures from perfect competition,
including relationship-specific investments, product differentiation, the
passage of time, imperfectly-specified property rights, and the resulting
risk of opportunism. As will be seen, application of the trade-off model is
ill-suited to arrangements that produce these types of efficiencies.
A. The Perfect Competition Model
Early twentieth century economists sought to identify and to
151
articulate the conditions necessary to “perfect competition.” According
to Nobel Laureate George Stigler, Frank Knight was the first to
152
articulate a complete formulation of the model. In 1921, Knight listed
eleven assumptions that, if satisfied, will lead to “perfect competition,”
153
including the following nine:
1. Members of society compose a cross-section of “normal human
beings” with
the attributes associated with members of Western
154
Societies.
2. Members act 155“with ‘complete rationality,’” subject to “ordinary
human motives.”
3. People are
free to act on their motives, or people “own
156
themselves.”
4. There is a “complete absence of physical obstacles to the making,
execution, and changing of plans at will; that is, there must be ‘perfect
mobility’ in 157
all economic adjustments, no cost involved in movements
or changes.”
5. “It follows158as a corollary from number 4 that there is perfect
competition.”
6. “Every member of Society is to act as an individual only, in entire
independence of all other persons. . . . . [I]n exchanges between
individuals, no interests
of persons not parties to the exchange are to
159
be concerned . . . .”
7. “[A]ll preying of individuals on each other” is excluded. “This
specification is really a corollary from numbers 2 and 3, which exclude

151. See Stigler, supra note 34, at 1 (describing the evolution of the perfect competition model); see
also Knight, supra note 35, passim; Pigou, supra note 38, at 172, 213 (discussing “simple
competition”).
152. Stigler, supra note 34, at 11 (“The concept of perfect competition received its complete
formulation in Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit.”); see also Knight, supra note 35, at 76–
81.
153. See Knight, supra note 35, at 76–81.
154. Id. at 76.
155. Id. at 76–77.
156. Id. at 77.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 78.
159. Id. According to Knight, the assumption of “[i]ndividual independence in action excludes all
forms of collusion, all degrees of monopoly or tendency to monopoly.” See id.; see also supra note 63.
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fraud or deceit and theft or brigandage respectively.”
8. “The 161
motives for division of labor and exchange must be present and
active.”
9. “All given
factors and conditions are . . . to remain absolutely
162
unchanged.”

Taken together, Knight said, these various conditions would result in
“perfect competition” and thus, a general competitive equilibrium,
namely an allocation of resources that maximized society’s welfare given
163
its endowments of labor, other inputs, and technical knowledge.
Implicit was the assumption that the state would create and enforce basic
rights of property and contract, creating an institutional framework that
164
was exogenous to the marketplace. Moreover, the costs, prices, and
output in each market would depend, in part, upon technology, derived
from scientific and engineering considerations reflected in a production
165
function. Thus, technological improvements would manifest themselves
as changes in the production function, reduced production cost, and
166
lower prices. Finally, given its exclusion of information costs, obstacles
to movement, and the like, the perfect competition model implied that
production, exchange, and the resulting allocation of resources took

160. Id. at 78–79.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 85–86; Stigler, supra note 35, at 38.
164. See Pigou, supra note 38, at xii, 127–30; see also Friedrich A. Hayek, Free Enterprise and
Competitive Order, in Individualism and Economic Order, supra note 47, at 110–16 (explaining that
well-functioning competitive order depends upon a properly-designed “legal framework” of contract,
property, tort, and business law); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (explaining that
adequate property institutions are necessary for the price system to produce an efficient allocation of
resources); Knight, supra note 35, at 56–57 (“[T]he foundation of the process [to be studied] is the
private ownership of productive resources—a synonym for individual freedom.”); Stigler, supra note
35, at 22 (noting that perfect competition depends upon enforcement of contracts and protection of
private property); infra notes 224–25 and accompanying text (explaining how TCE undermined the
assumption that the institutional framework is exogenous to market actors).
165. See Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 546 (1951) (“Underlying
economics is technology. As far as we are concerned, the technical expert has completed his job when
he has handed on to the economist, accountant, or cost engineer the physical relationship between
output and various inputs. This relationship is called the ‘production function.’ The production
function tells us how much output we can hope to get if we have so much labor and so much capital
and so much land, etc.”); Stigler, supra note 35, at 33–34 (noting that production function determines
the combination of inputs necessary to produce certain outputs); id. at 109–10 (“Production functions
are descriptive of techniques or systems of organization of productive services, and they are therefore
taken from disciplines such as engineering and industrial chemistry: to the economic theorist they are
data of analysis.”); see also Scott Moss, The History of the Theory of the Firm from Marshall to
Robinson and Chamberlin: The Source of Positivism in Economics, 51 Economica 307, 313 (1984)
(noting that Pigou’s 1932 perfect competition model assumed a production function based on
“technological factors [that] were considered to be entirely exogenous to the firm”).
166. See Stigler, supra note 35, at 38.
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167

place instantaneously. By assumption, the perfect competition model
168
functioned in a world divorced from time.
There was no apparent place for the business firm—complete
vertical integration—in a perfectly competitive market, or, for that
169
matter, partial vertical integration. In perfect competition, individual
owners of factors of production—including labor—allocated resources
through continuous, costless, voluntary exchanges; there was thus no
need for vertical integration’s hierarchical direction of economic
170
Indeed, Knight’s rigorous articulation of the perfect
activity.
competition model omitted any reference to “firms,” relying instead
171
upon individuals as the model’s building blocks. Still, perhaps because
firms were ubiquitous, some economists included firms “by fiat” in their
172
articulations of the model. Others argued that the firm, or at least
integration from one level to another, was explained by technological
173
considerations.

167. See Knight, supra note 35, at 78 (“[In perfect competition, e]ach person continuously
produces a complete commodity which is consumed as fast as produced. The exchange of commodities
must be virtually instantaneous and costless.”). However, Knight also assumed that production itself
entailed “a brief interval of time.” See id. at 81.
168. See Hayek, supra note 47, at 96 (explaining that satisfaction of perfect competition’s various
assumptions results in instantaneous equilibrium); Knight, supra note 35, at 81–82; Machovec, supra
note 34, at 178–79 (describing perfect competition’s instantaneous market clearing); see also Bain,
supra note 54, at 14–15 (explaining that price theory focuses on determining the “end result” of
responses to a “fixed set of determinants” and does not generally incorporate questions regarding the
passage of time and movement from one equilibrium to the next).
169. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & Econ. 1, 4–8 (1983)
(discussing various degrees of vertical integration); Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern,
Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale L.J. 1, 2 (1959) (examining varieties of partial
contractual integration).
170. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, Am. Econ. Rev., Dec. 1972, at 777, 777 (assuming that activities conducted within the
firm can also be conducted via market transactions).
171. See Knight, supra note 35, at 80 n.1 (“[The individualistic world of perfect competition,] in
contrast with ‘enterprise,’ [is one] in which the operative has lost his responsible status and lives, not by
the production and sale of a commodity, but by the sale of productive services to an entrepreneur.”); id.
at 78 (“Each person continuously produces a complete commodity which is consumed as fast as
produced. . . . Each member of the society is to act as an individual only, in entire independence of all
other persons.”); see also Pigou, supra note 38 (examining whether the free play of “self-interest” will
maximize society’s welfare without invoking the existence of firms).
172. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 35, at 21 (describing firms and households as the basic economic
units in society); see also Harold Demsetz, The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution, Am.
Econ. Rev., May 1997, at 426, 426 (“The firm does not play a central role in [neoclassical] theory.”);
Moss, supra note 165, at 310–11 (concluding that Alfred Marshall derived his theory of the firm
inductively, by examining characteristics of firms in the real world).
173. See William G. Shepherd, Market Power and Economic Welfare 37 (Donald J. Dewey ed.,
1970) (“The cost advantages in a firm may be of two types: technical and pecuniary. Only technical
economies represent a genuine improvement in social efficiency.”); Williamson, supra note 66, at 366
(“[A]ccording[] [to price theory], efforts to reconfigure firm and market structures that violated
‘natural’ boundaries were believed to have market power origins.”). Price theory’s quintessential
exemplar of technologically-induced vertical integration involved integration of iron and steel
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As noted earlier, this model, with its unrealistic assumptions and
implications, formed the foundation of neoclassical price theory as well
as the model of workable competition and its partial equilibrium trade174
off paradigm. Indeed, while workable competition and its trade-off
paradigm recognized a few departures from perfect competition, both
also embraced several other assumptions, including the presence of a
well-functioning institutional framework and the absence of
175
opportunism, as well as the resulting externality and market failure.
Perfect competition also formed the starting point for Coase’s effort to
explain the existence of firms, the most ubiquitous non-standard
176
contracts. That is, while some economists simply assumed that firms
exist and others attributed them to technological considerations, Coase
sought a more precise explanation for why these institutions arise. He
began by asking why firms exist at all, given that all production, and the
resulting allocation of society’s resources, could, as the perfect
competition model implied, be “regulated by price movements,”—in
177
other words, continuous transactions by individuals. Moreover, Coase
expressly omitted any explanation rooted in the existence or acquisition
of market power, thereby retaining, at least implicitly, perfect
competition’s assumption that no entity possesses more than a minuscule
178
share of the relevant market and that no entity colludes with others.
Instead, Coase found the rationale for the firm in a different and
slight departure from the rigorous assumptions of the perfect

production to achieve cost savings. Several leading texts of the price-theoretic era employed this
example. See, e.g., Bain, supra note 31, at 156–57; Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 120; Scherer,
supra note 41, at 70. Indeed, in 1942, George Stigler referred to this as a “stock” example of
technological determination of vertical integration. See Stigler, supra note 54, at 22.
174. See supra notes 34, 56 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
176. See 7 Areeda, supra note 105, at 235–36 (“[C]onspiracies among unrelated units are relatively
infrequent.”); see also R. H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, Am. Econ. Rev., Sept.
1992, at 713, 714 [hereinafter Coase, Institutional Structure] (“[M]ost resources in a modern economic
system are employed within firms.”).
177. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 388 (1937) [hereinafter Coase, Nature
of the Firm] (“[H]aving regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements,
production could be carried on without any organisation at all, well might we ask, why is there any
organisation?”); see also R. H. Coase, Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 3, 4 (1988)
[hereinafter Coase, Origin] (“[I]f there were atomistic competition, where every transaction involving
the use of another’s labour, materials or money was the subject of a market transaction, there would
be no need for organization.” (quoting Coase’s 1932 correspondence) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
178. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 19, 26–27 (1988)
[hereinafter Coase, Meaning] (“In the early 1930s I was looking for an explanation for the existence of
the firm which did not depend on monopoly. I found it, of course, in transaction costs.”); Coase,
Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390–91 (discussing a rationale for the firm without mentioning
monopoly or market power); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (collecting authorities
providing that the perfect competition model assumes the absence of cooperation between otherwise
independent economic units).
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competition model, namely, the real-world cost of continuous market
transacting—“concluding a separate contract for each exchange
179
transaction” —a cost that the perfect competition model assumed
180
away. While perfect competition assumed the absence of obstacles to
discovering and transacting with trading partners, Coase understood that
181
this was not the case in “the real world.” According to Coase, the most
obvious cost of relying upon the price mechanism to conduct economic
182
activity was the cost of “discovering what the relevant prices are.” Next
was the cost of “negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each
183
exchange transaction which takes place on a market.” This explanation
envisioned firms arising and existing in a world characterized by minimal
184
departures from perfect competition. To be more precise, Coase
offered an explanation for firms that was entirely plausible in an
unrealistic world, with perfectly specified property rights, but without
specific investments, opportunism, product differentiation, or economies
of scale. At the same time, as noted earlier, the model of workable
competition had also relied upon many of the same unrealistic
assumptions that animated the perfect competition model, including the
185
absence of information and bargaining costs. Thus, Coase’s account
could also explain why firms arose in a world with workable competition
and economies of scale, but again without specific investments,
opportunism, poorly-specified property rights, or any effort to acquire or
maintain market power. Ironically, Coase dealt with a broader range of
transaction costs rooted in other departures from perfect competition in
186
private correspondence predating his seminal article. Nonetheless,
Coase concluded that partial contractual integration could eliminate such
187
costs. Thus, while such costs could explain certain non-standard

179. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 391–92.
180. Coase, Meaning, supra note 178, at 19 (“All that was needed was to recognize that there were
costs of carrying out market transactions and to incorporate them into the analysis, something which
economists had failed to do.”); see also Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390 (“The main
reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price
mechanism.”). Coase was not the only economist to seek an explanation for the existence of firms in
some departure from perfect competition. More than a decade before Coase’s work, Frank Knight
argued that firms arise as risk-bearing mechanisms in response to uncertainty. See Knight, supra note
35, at 233–312.
181. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390 n.4 (noting that “static theory,” or perfect
competition, assumes that all prices are known to everyone, but that “this is clearly not true of the real
world”); see also Demsetz, supra note 172, at 426.
182. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390.
183. Id. at 390–91.
184. See infra notes 206–10 and accompanying text; see also Demsetz, supra note 172, at 426 (“The
cost of using the price system was not clearly defined by Coase, although he refers to the costs of
acquiring price information, negotiating and exchanging.”).
185. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 229–38 and accompanying text.
187. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 12–13 (discussing portions of 1932 correspondence).
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contracts, they could not explain the emergence of the particular non188
Because Coase was only
standard contract known as the firm.
concerned with explanations for complete integration, his public work did
not identify this separate category of transaction costs, leaving that task
189
to work by others published three decades later.
More than three decades later, Coase returned to the subject of
transaction costs in his pathbreaking work that gave rise to the Coase
190
Theorem. Scholars who applied Coase’s work on social cost outside the
context of industrial organization embraced this definition and did not
191
relate “transaction costs” to vertical integration. Economic actors could
avoid these costs, Coase said, by instead organizing and conducting the
192
very same activity within a firm. After all, the firm was basically a
single contract between entrepreneur and employee, a contract that
empowered the former to direct the latter without the individualized
193
negotiation that characterized a market transaction. Reliance on this
particular contract, then, reduced the discovery and bargaining costs
parties otherwise would incur when relying upon the market to conduct
194
economic activity. Firms arose “voluntarily,” he said, because the cost
of organizing production pursuant to this single, non-standard contract is
lower than the cost of conducting the same activity via continuous
195
market contracting.

188. See id. at 13; see also Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. Econ.
& Org. 65, 73 (1988) (explaining that complete vertical integration is the “paradigm problem” that
transaction cost economics seeks to solve).
189. See infra notes 239–73 and accompanying text.
190. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960) [hereinafter Coase,
Social Cost] (“[T]o carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes
to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations
leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that
the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.”).
191. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 48–49, 54–57 (3d ed. 1986); Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1106–10 (1972); Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality,
22 J.L. & Econ. 141, 144–42 (1979).
192. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390–91.
193. See id. at 391 (“The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may
be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. The
essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur. Within
these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production.”); see also Scott E. Masten, A
Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 181, 194 (1988) (explaining that economic actors could
employ contract law to replicate all of the rights and duties that characterize the employer-employee
relationship, the distinguishing mark of the business firm).
194. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 391 (“A factor of production (or the owner
thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating
within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the
working of the price mechanism.”).
195. See id. at 389 n.3 (“[F]irms arise voluntarily because they represent a more effective method
of organising production.”).
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Several decades later, scholars would rediscover Coase’s insight and
proceed to identify a wider range of “transaction costs” that might induce
196
individuals to abjure reliance on the market in favor of firms. These
costs were the result of departures from perfect competition that were
different from, and more fundamental than, those that Coase had
197
198
identified. We will return to consider these costs later in this Article.
It is important to note here, however, that Coase’s 1937 article focused
only upon the sort of discovery and haggling costs discussed above.
B. The Technological Nature of Coase’s Transaction Costs
The sort of discovery and bargaining costs on which Coase did focus
were those that, by their nature, tended to precede an individual market
transaction and thus also to precede the production and sale of a final
product to consumers. Moreover, these costs are virtually
indistinguishable from any number of the garden-variety production
costs of technological origin recognized by and incorporated within the
perfect competition model, costs that need not give rise to firms or other
non-standard contracts. For instance, an individual may consume
199
significant time—a cost—searching for relevant prices. He or she may
also purchase a trade periodical that reproduces prices gathered by the
200
periodical’s publisher. Like any other input, the production of such
periodicals will consume scarce resources, and the periodical’s publisher
201
will charge a positive price for the publication. Or, a party’s potential
196. Major contributions include: Williamson, supra note 66; Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966); Benjamin Klein et
al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ.
297 (1978); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 92 n.6, 95–
96 (1960) (stating that the “special services” rationale for minimum resale price maintenance does not
apply to undifferentiated products and applies only to certain “branded products”); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, Am. Econ. Rev.,
May 1971, at 112.
197. See infra notes 253–73 and accompanying text (explaining how transaction costs identified
during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s depended upon departures from perfect competition such as
product differentiation, specific investments, and opportunism). Note that transaction costs flowing
from these departures are “second order” in nature. For instance, product differentiation, while a
departure from perfect competition, is not itself a cost of transacting. If anything, differentiation can
reduce such costs. However, the existence of differentiation, or a desire to create it, can create a risk of
opportunism, and thus, raise the cost of relying upon the market to conduct economic activity. See
infra note 264 and accompanying text.
198. See infra Part II.C.
199. Cf. Stigler, supra note 47, at 214–16 (explaining that the chief search cost for purchasers is
time).
200. Cf. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390 (“[The cost of discovering relevant
prices] may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this
information.”).
201. See Knight, supra note 35, at 73–76 (explaining that the cost relevant to perfect competition is
a sacrificed alternative); Stigler, supra note 35, at 38 (“Costs [relevant to perfect competition] are
merely the amounts productive services would secure if they were transferred to some other use.”);
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trading partners may overcome some of these costs by advertising or
developing a strong trademark, incorporating these promotional costs in
202
their products’ prices. Moreover, once a party identifies a favored
vendor, it will have to contact that vendor and bargain over price and
203
quantity. This bargaining will also consume resources, including labor
204
that bargaining parties could employ elsewhere. Finally, if the vendor
consents to a sale, the parties may memorialize their agreement in
writing, consuming additional resources, if only paper, ink, and the
opportunity cost of labor consumed negotiating and preparing the
205
agreement.
In short, the sort of “transaction costs” Coase emphasized are barely
distinguishable from the costs that individual economic actors ordinarily
206
incur in perfect competition. Indeed, one scholar who adopted a
definition of transaction costs later endorsed by Coase has explained that
there is little, if any, analytical distinction between these sorts of
207
“transaction costs” on the one hand, and production costs on the other.
Instead, a choice to rely upon “the market,” with its additional costs,
would seem indistinguishable from a choice to purchase from a more
208
expensive vendor, or to employ less efficient production technology. In

Stigler, supra note 47, at 216 (suggesting that localized markets that overcome information costs may
charge participating sellers a “toll”).
202. See Stigler, supra note 47, at 216, 220–24.
203. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
204. See Knight, supra note 35, at 73–76.
205. See id. at 63 (explaining how labor is a cost within perfect competition); see also Benjamin
Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship
Revisited, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 199, 200 (1988) (referring to costs identified by Coase as “ink costs”).
206. See Dahlman, supra note 191, at 145; Klein, supra note 205, at 209 (contending that Coase
equated the cost of relying upon the market with the “narrow transaction costs of discovering prices
and executing contracts”); see also supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining how, in perfect
competition, the production function describes the technological relationship between inputs).
207. See Dahlman, supra note 191, at 145 (“[P]roportional transaction costs are productive in
precisely the same way that resources used up in the physical transformation of inputs into outputs are
productive—indeed they could be treated in an identical manner with no loss of information.”); id. at
146 (“[I]t is difficult to see any significant difference between the set up cost of an exchange, called a
transaction cost, and the set up cost of a basic unit of production, or the fixed cost of a firm.”); id. at
152 (“[I]t would be desirable to reduce such transaction costs, of whatever kind, preferably to zero if
that were possible, just as it would be desirable to decrease costs of production in a firm.”); id. at 148
(“These, then, represent the first approximation to a workable concept of transaction costs: search and
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs.”); see also R. H.
Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in The Firm, the Market, and the Law, supra note 32, at
1, 6 [hereinafter Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law] (“In order to carry out a market
transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being
observed, and so on.” (quoting Coase, Social Cost, supra note 190, at 15) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); id. at 6 (endorsing Professor Dahlman’s definition of transaction costs).
208. Dahlman, supra note 191, at 144 (“Just as self-interested individuals will select the cheapest
mode of transportation, it is possible to show that they may choose to use a medium of exchange as an
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the same way, “discovery” by individual actors of the institution known
as “the firm” is the economic equivalent of the discovery of a new
209
production technology. Both alter the “production function,” that is,
the mathematical relationship between inputs and output, and thus
210
reduce the costs of producing any given type of output.
Although Coase’s article was truly revolutionary, it may not have
appeared so to practitioners of the traditional price-theoretic model, who
had already determined that technological considerations determined the
extent of vertical integration. Indeed, three decades after its publication,
George Stigler treated Coase’s explanation for the firm and the extent of
vertical integration as “related” to Stigler’s own technological
211
explanation. That is to say, Coase’s discovery of a transaction-cost
explanation for integration did not induce Stigler or other price theorists
to abandon technological explanations for integration or to reformulate
212
Paradigms and their
the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm.
practitioners are stubborn, and practitioners of the dominant paradigm
could well have incorporated Coase’s discovery, which posited only
minor deviations from perfect competition, within their own price213
theoretic models, including the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm.

alternative to barter if [fewer] resources are used as a consequence.”).
209. See Stigler, supra note 35, at 34 (explaining how “development of new forms of business
organization” can enhance economic growth); see also Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism,
and Democracy 84 (1942) (“[T]he competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new
source of supply, [or] the new type of organization . . . is much more effective than [price
competition] . . . .” (emphasis added)).
210. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, at 716–18 (explaining how the firm and
other non-standard contracts alter the institutional framework in a way that reduces costs and changes
the allocation of resources); see also Stigler, supra note 47, at 216–17 (characterizing used car
dealership as a specialized firm that arises to reduce the (technological) costs of bringing buyers and
sellers together).
211. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 170–71 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter Stigler, The
Theory of Price]; id. at 168–70 (discussing Stigler’s own theory of vertical integration, resting on
division of labor, extent of the market, and economies of scale); Stigler, supra note 47, at 216–17; see
also Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 32, at 65 (stating, albeit in conclusory terms, that
Stigler’s analysis “does not take us very far”); George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by
the Extent of the Market, 59 J. Pol. Econ. 185 (1951) [hereinafter Stigler, Division of Labor]
(articulating this theory of vertical integration in greater detail).
212. See M. A. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27, 29–30 (1949)
(invoking Coase’s 1937 article, but also repeating and endorsing the typical technological explanation
for vertical integration).
213. See Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 63–65 (explaining that scientists seek to
tame anomalies by adjusting conceptual categories within existing paradigms); id. at 78 (concluding
that scientists “will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to
eliminate any apparent conflict” between predicted and actual results under an existing paradigm).
Scholars have identified “shadow paradigms” that narrow scholars’ field of vision outside the antitrust
context. See Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1201, 1227–29 (2001)
(explaining that much economic analysis of tort law rests upon the “farmer-railroad” exemplar and
that this reliance has in at least one instance produced misleading results); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow
of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2177–82, 2197 (1997) (arguing that leading literature on the
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While scholars would subsequently claim that Coase’s transaction cost
approach undermined the technological explanation for vertical
214
integration, price theorists apparently did not think so at the time.
Indeed, in 1952, Coase’s 1937 work was republished as one of several
215
“Readings in Price Theory.”
This is not to say that Coase explained how firms could arise in a
perfectly competitive world. Despite their close similarity to ordinary
production costs, the perfect competition model excluded bargaining and
216
information costs by fiat. Moreover, firms reduced such costs by
working other departures from perfect competition. According to Coase,
the defining characteristic of the firm was “the suppression of the price
217
mechanism” for allocating resources. This suppression entailed a
contract between an entrepreneur and employee that suspended, at least
218
for a short period, the mobility of the employee, a factor of production.
For Coase, the particular contract known as “the firm” eliminated
transaction costs and thus avoided the market failure that otherwise
would occur, ensuring that resources moved to their best use,
219
unobstructed by the transaction costs the firm avoided. This suspension
of mobility contravened a key assumption of the perfect competition
model, namely, the complete absence of obstacles to the movement of
resources, including the absence of any costs of altering such
220
movements. That is, the institution traded one departure from perfect
competition for another and improved overall welfare. While the firm
did not create “perfect competition,” it was a second-best institutional
221
arrangement in a world where true perfect competition is not possible.
distinction between property rights and liability rules rests upon the unarticulated “shadow example”
of automobile accidents).
214. Cf. Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transaction Costs and the New Institutionalism,
in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare 395, 399–400 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1985)
(explaining that technical economies cannot explain firm boundaries because, absent transaction costs,
such economies can “be achieved equally well if the factors of production are owned by independent
individuals”).
215. See Readings in Price Theory (George J. Stigler & Kenneth E. Boulding eds., 1952).
216. See Knight, supra note 35, at 76–82; see also id. at 20 (perfect knowledge is the “prime
essential” to perfect competition); Stigler, supra note 47, at 213 (explaining that economic theory
generally ignores the cost of acquiring information).
217. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 389 (“[T]he distinguishing mark of the firm
is the supersession of the price mechanism.”).
218. See id. at 391–92.
219. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
220. See Knight, supra note 35, at 77 (“[The perfect competition model] assume[s] complete
absence of physical obstacles to the making, execution, and changing of plans at will; that is, there
must be ‘perfect mobility’ in all economic adjustments, no cost involved in movements or changes.”);
see also Stigler, Competitive Price, supra note 35, at 21 (including absence of “institutional restraints”
on resource movement as a requirement of perfect competition).
221. See Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 32, at 67–68 (asserting that non-standard
contracts and other practices inexplicable under price theory are often necessary for “bringing about a
competitive situation”); cf. Hayek, supra note 47, at 96 (suggesting that many activities inconsistent
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The world of perfect competition was, like the world without friction,
222
only a thought experiment.
Coase showed how this world was less imaginary than it first
seemed. While others accepted the bargaining and discovery costs that
prevented perfect competition from arising, Coase explained how the
223
firm itself, a voluntary institution, could overcome such costs. In so
doing, Coase demonstrated that transaction costs are not necessarily
exogenous or given, but instead can depend upon background legal
224
rules. Indeed, the contingency of transaction costs upon background
225
rules and institutions was a theme of Coase’s later work. A wellfunctioning firm, then, eliminated the costs that prevented an otherwise
atomistic market from reaching perfect competition. Though not
necessary in the imaginary world of perfect competition, the firm made
such competition possible, or at least more possible, than it otherwise
226
would be. This function was perhaps so taken for granted that
economists often ignored the question that Coase posed and treated the
firm—and not individuals—as the most basic productive unit of
227
analysis.
C. Non-Technological Transaction Costs
As noted earlier, the ex ante haggling and discovery costs that
Coase emphasized in 1937 did not exhaust the costs that may arise when
228
individuals rely upon the market to conduct economic activity. This
should come as no surprise, as the costs that Coase identified represent
only one sort of departure from both perfect and workable competition
models—and a contrived departure at best—that impacts the cost of
relying on market contractions to conduct economic activity. Other

with perfect competition are in fact methods of achieving a more “competitive” result); Dahlman,
supra note 191, at 144–46.
222. Knight, supra note 35, at 6–11 (analogizing economist’s modeling techniques to those
employed by physicists, and analogizing unrealistic assumptions of economists to physicists’
assumption of “perpetual motion at every stage”); Thomas S. Kuhn, A Function for Thought
Experiments, in The Essential Tension, supra note 58, at 240; see also Stigler, supra note 35, at 24
(analogizing assumptions of perfect competition to physicists’ assumption of a world without friction).
223. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 389–91.
224. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, at 717–18 (explaining how background rules
construct the institutional framework and thereby impact the allocation of resources); Coase, Social
Cost, supra note 190, at 15–16, 19.
225. See, e.g., Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, passim; see also Coase, The Firm, the
Market, and the Law, supra note 207, at 28 (“[The law can] make transactions more or less costly by
altering the requirements for making a legally binding contract.”).
226. See Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 32, at 68 (contending that non-standard
contracts and other suspect practices are often methods of “bringing about a competitive situation”).
227. See Stigler, supra note 35, at 21; Demsetz, supra note 172, at 426 (stating that firms are
present in perfect competition).
228. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
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departures producing such costs could include the passage of time
between transactions, investments specific to particular relationships,
threats of opportunism, or poorly-specified property rights.
Indeed, even before he published The Nature of the Firm, Coase
explained—in unpublished correspondence—how vertical integration
could overcome opportunism made possible by relationship-specific
229
investments and the passage of time. Coase posited the example of a
manufacturer who installed specialized equipment to serve the needs of
230
distinct customers. By installing this equipment, Coase said, the
manufacturer would render itself vulnerable to what modern economists
call opportunism, that is, the possibility that, after the passage of time,
the special customer might take its business elsewhere, leaving the
231
supplier with new but unused equipment. Or, the customer could
“merely” threaten this course, inducing the manufacturer to renegotiate,
232
and reduce its price below the manufacturer’s average cost. This
prospect of opportunism, Coase concluded, would cause the supplier
contemplating such an investment to internalize the tangible risk that the
original investment in the equipment would lead to lower than normal
233
returns because of subsequent opportunism. This risk, in turn, would
234
raise the manufacturer’s cost of capital accordingly. The manufacturer
would have to cover this cost, by passing it on to its purchaser as part of
235
the price of the inputs produced by the specialized equipment.
By relying upon the market (“transacting”) to purchase specialized
inputs, then, the purchaser in Coase’s example would incur a cost: the
premium its supplier would charge to compensate itself for the risk of the
purchaser’s opportunism. To avoid this transaction cost, the purchaser
might integrate backwards, taking on the manufacturing process itself,
thereby avoiding a transaction, eliminating the prospect of opportunism,
236
and minimizing the cost of obtaining the input. Or, the customer might
take the less drastic course, namely, relying upon the market to purchase
inputs while agreeing not to take its business elsewhere, or, in other
words, to deal exclusively with the supplier, thereby eliminating the risk

229. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 12–13 (reproducing and discussing portions of Coase’s
1932 correspondence).
230. Id. at 13.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.; see also Williamson, supra note 66, at 32–35 (formalizing the result that a firm relying
upon the market to distribute its product will charge a premium reflecting any risk of opportunism).
236. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13 (“[I]f the consuming firm decides to make this
product this risk is absent and it may well be that this difference in capital costs may well offset the
relative inefficiency in actual operating.”).
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of opportunism that would otherwise result in a premium. Indeed, as
explained earlier, Coase did not pursue this opportunism-based
explanation for the existence of firms, because he believed that this less
238
drastic alternative of partial integration could eliminate these costs.
About forty years later, other scholars would rediscover Coase’s
identification of specific investments as a source of transaction costs, and
embellish Coase’s then-unknown point with express reference to the
239
concept of opportunism. These scholars argued that market transacting
in the presence of relationship-specific investments and passing time
could render one or both parties vulnerable to post-transaction
240
opportunism. Parties could avoid such opportunism in one of two ways.
First, they could abjure the specific investment, thereby forgoing the
benefits of specialization, and relying instead upon general technology
241
producing undifferentiated inputs. Or, the parties could avoid these
242
costs by complete or partial integration. At the same time, these
scholars took issue with Coase’s claim that partial integration could
243
always eliminate these costs.
Even before these scholars “rediscovered” Coase’s insight, others
were identifying non-technological costs of relying upon the market and
explaining how complete or partial contractual integration might
overcome them. Perhaps most famously, Lester Telser argued in 1960
that the production of promotional services by independent retailers is
susceptible to free riding by such retailers, leading to suboptimal

237. See Klein et al., supra note 196, at 308–09 (explaining how an exclusive dealing contract can
reduce the threat of opportunism); see also Williamson, supra note 66, at 32–35 (explaining that
adoption of a contract eliminating opportunism will eliminate the price premium).
238. See Coase, Meaning, supra note 178, at 30–31 (describing pre-1937 notes concluding that the
desire to avoid fraud by trading partners was not an impetus to integration); Coase, Origin, supra note
177, at 15–16 (reproducing correspondence in which Coase concludes that parties could eliminate the
risk of such opportunism by means of partial integration, thereby suggesting that the risk of such
opportunism was not a significant cause of complete vertical integration).
239. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
20–40, 82–105 (1975) [hereinafter Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies]; see also Klein et al., supra
note 196; Williamson, supra note 188, at 65–66 (articulating the mainstream view regarding
rediscovery of Coase’s insight).
240. See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 196, at 297–302 (explaining how the article is an application
of “Coase’s fundamental insight”); Williamson, supra note 188, at 66–72; id. at 71 (“The intertemporal
governance of contractual relations is greatly complicated as a consequence of this condition [bilateral
dependence caused by relationship-specific investments].”).
241. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 31–32 (explaining that, where asset specificity is absent,
discrete market contracting functions well despite bounded rationality and opportunism); Langlois,
supra note 47, at 7–8, 11–14 (explaining that specific investment can deepen specialization and
enhance welfare).
242. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 90–98; Klein et al., supra note 196, at 298–307.
243. See Klein, supra note 205, at 200–11 (taking issue with Coase’s argument that parties can
employ long-term contracts to prevent opportunism); see also Klein et al., supra note 196, at 302–07
(detailing purported shortcomings in efforts to control opportunism via partial integration).
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244

production of such services. Telser surmised that minimum resale price
maintenance (“RPM”) agreements between manufacturers and dealers
could forestall such behavior by ensuring that dealers who promote a
manufacturer’s differentiated product can recoup the rewards of doing
245
so. Absent such restraints, he said, a dealer might expend resources
promoting the manufacturer’s product—a relationship-specific
investment—only to find dealers who did not make such investments
246
subsequently luring away customers with discounts. Telser did not
mention Coase’s work, transaction costs, or opportunism. Still, he
expressly limited his argument to instances in which promotional services
were “specific to the commodity” produced by the manufacturer, and his
work plainly rested on the realization that reliance upon market
transacting to conduct economic activity—here, promotion and
distribution—imposed a cost, in the form of foregone sales, upon a
247
manufacturer as a result of dealers’ opportunism. Moreover, Telser
posited that rational manufacturers would anticipate such posttransaction costs and seek to minimize them through non-standard
248
contracting, namely RPM.
Just six years later, Robert Bork expanded Telser’s analysis and
began to integrate it with Coase’s original work. In particular, Bork
reiterated Coase’s 1937 insight that the institution known as “the firm” is
just one form of contractual integration, analogous to other forms of
249
partial, contractual integration. According to Bork, partial integration
in the form of minimum RPM or exclusive territories could allow firms
that relied upon independent dealers—the market—to distribute their
goods so as to ensure the same type and amount of promotion that a fully
250
integrated firm would produce. At the same time, Bork did not
expressly refer to “transaction costs” or “market failure,” but instead
244. See Telser, supra note 196, at 89–96.
245. See id.; see also id. at 95–96 (explaining that the argument depended upon the assumption that
the product in question was branded and thus differentiated). As Telser noted, Ward Bowman had
previously pointed out that minimum RPM could prevent “spillovers” that characterized promotional
services like advertising and demonstrations. See id. at 89 n.4 (citing Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The
Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 825, 840–43 (1955)).
246. See id. at 89–96.
247. See id. at 89 (“We must understand these retailers’ services to be specific to the commodity
[produced by the manufacturer] and unrelated to the retailers’ methods of generally doing business.”).
248. See id. at 91–92.
249. See Bork, supra note 196, at 384.
250. See id. at 429–39; id. at 472 (“In economic analysis, a contract integration is as much a firm as
an ownership integration. The nature of the standards applied to them through the Sherman Act
should be the same.”). Bork implicitly assumed that the fully integrated firm he hypothesized
flawlessly pursued its owners’ interests. As I have explained elsewhere, however, manufacturers may
rely upon dealers to distribute their goods precisely because their employees do not possess the
incentives necessary to pursue owners’ interests. See Alan J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand
Restraints, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 553, 595–98 (2004). Thus, promotion by a fully integrated firm may not
replicate that achieved by properly incentivized independent dealers. Id.
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claimed that his analysis followed directly from “basic price theory,” a
251
contention subsequently repeated by Richard Posner. Moreover, he
plainly recognized that a manufacturer’s reliance upon an unrestrained
market to distribute its goods could entail a cost, which Bork measured
as the deviation from the promotional expenditures and economic results
that a completely integrated (and properly incentivized) firm would
252
achieve.
The Telser/Bork argument rested upon several departures from
perfect competition, as well as some beneficial departures from workable
competition. These included relationship-specific investments, product
differentiation, the passage of time between promotional investments,
253
and when those investments bear fruit. However, these beneficial
conditions also created a risk of opportunism, and thus externality and
market failure, given the imperfect specification of property rights
preventing dealers from recouping the benefits of promotional
254
investments in an atomistic market. As Bork explained, intrabrand
restraints could function as a sort of contractual property right, thereby
altering the institutional framework in a way that changed the content of
255
economic activity and resulted in optimal promotional expenditures.
Other scholars built on this foundation, elaborating on how various nonstandard contracts could reduce the cost of relying upon the market.
Tying contracts, franchising, and exclusive dealing—all could overcome
256
market failure and thus, reduce transaction costs.
Practitioners of workable competition had assumed away bargaining
and information costs, specific investments, the passage of time, and the

251. See Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 Yale L.J. 950, 952
(1968) (“[The contention that] r.p.m. creates an efficient utilization of resources [is] grounded in basic
price theory.”); see also Bork, supra note 60, at 116–17 (contending that price theory is the only
methodology capable of informing a rational antitrust policy); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925, 932 (1979) (“The Chicago School has largely prevailed
with respect to its basic point: that the proper lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theory.”).
252. See Bork, supra note 196, at 434–36 (treating promotion produced by a completely integrated
firm as a baseline against which to measure the impact of non-standard contracts on promotional
decisions).
253. See Telser, supra note 196, at 87 (asserting that market power due to product differentiation is
a necessary condition for use of minimum RPM to overcome market failure).
254. Id. at 89–96 (explaining promotional expenditures and free riding). Absent the passage of
time, for instance, a manufacturer could constantly observe and respond to suboptimal promotion by
dealers. See infra note 261.
255. See Bork, supra note 251, at 956 (suggesting that RPM confers the equivalent of property
rights on dealers); Meese, supra note 250, at 595–607; id. at 602 & n.266 (collecting authorities
suggesting that non-standard contracts, including minimum RPM, create contractual property rights).
256. See Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts,
28 J.L. & Econ. 345, 349–54 (1985); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair”
Contractual Arrangements, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1980, at 356 [hereinafter Klein, Transaction Cost
Determinants]; Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1982); Paul H. Rubin, The
Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & Econ. 223 (1978).
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resulting threat of opportunism borne by firms that relied upon
257
Both Coase’s
unbridled markets to conduct economic activity.
unpublished speculations and more modern practitioners of TCE
reversed this presumption, assuming several departures from the perfect
competition model in addition to those emphasized in Coase’s 1937
258
article. For instance, both accounts assumed a conscious effort to
produce differentiated products in response to varying consumer
preferences. Such differentiation would, of course, contravene the
perfect competition model’s assumption of homogenous products.
Moreover, if such differentiation conferred market power on a seller,
such power would itself contravene perfect competition. These accounts
also assumed that market actors might make investments specific to
particular relationships or customers, thereby enhancing product quality
259
but creating assets not readily transferred to other uses. Immobility of
such specific investments contravenes the assumptions of perfect
competition and workable competition, namely that resources can be
260
redeployed instantly and without cost.
These accounts also assumed that time would pass between initial
261
investment and subsequent economic activity. This passage of time,
combined with specific investments, created the prospect that trading
partners might behave opportunistically, appropriating or threatening to
262
Such opportunism, an
appropriate investments made by others.
externality, was only possible because property rights were poorly
263
These departures from perfect competition were not
specified.
themselves transaction costs, in the same way that, say, the cost of
257. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
258. Cf. Yoram Barzel & Levis A. Kochin, Ronald Coase on the Nature of Social Cost as a Key to
the Problem of the Firm, 94 Scandinavian J. Econ. 19, 25 (1992) (noting that Coase’s 1937 “discussion
of transaction costs” is “brief and cryptic”).
259. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13 (“Suppose the production of a particular product
requires a large capital equipment which is, however, specialized insofar that it can only be used for
the particular product concerned or can only be readapted at great cost.”); Klein et al., supra note 196,
at 299 (“Once installed, an asset may be so expensive to remove or so specialized to a particular user
that if the price paid to the owner were somehow reduced the asset’s services to that user would not be
reduced.”); Langlois, supra note 47, at 7–8, 11–14 (noting that specific investments can enhance
specialization and product quality).
260. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
261. Cf. Posner, supra note 191, at 93–95 (explaining how the passage of time between sale and
performance can result in opportunistic breach of contract).
262. Klein et al., supra note 196, at 298–302 (explaining how the authors’ model assumes that the
seller purchases distinctive asset that it utilizes over time, and that purchasers are opportunistic); cf.
Knight, supra note 35, at 78–79 (“[Perfect competition model excludes] preying of individuals upon
each other [including] fraud or deceit and theft or brigandage.”). Some scholars believed the exclusion
of fraud and similar behavior to be redundant with the model’s assumption of perfect information. See
Stigler, supra note 35, at 22.
263. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1967, at 347,
348–49 (explaining how well-defined property rights induce property holders to internalize the social
costs and benefits of their actions).
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acquiring information was, nor were they exogenous, as they might result
from conscious efforts by rational economic actors to depart from perfect
competition. Instead, these departures were conditions—sometimes
264
beneficial—that could ultimately give rise to such costs. According to
Coase and others, these pervasive departures from perfect and workable
competition in the real world ensured that reliance on atomistic markets
to conduct economic activity would entail a cost of transacting and
produce a market failure and externality resulting in a suboptimal
265
allocation of resources. Taken together, each of these conditions
combined to increase the cost of relying upon discrete market
transactions to conduct economic activity. Moreover, unlike the costs
that Coase had emphasized, these latter costs had no analogue in the
technological costs recognized by the foundational model of perfect
competition, which had assumed perfectly-specified property rights and,
for instance, excluded opportunism, specific investment, and product
266
Put another way, these costs were nondifferentiation by fiat.
technological in origin, and contracts that reduced them produced non267
technological efficiencies. Indeed, according to scholars who identified
this category of transaction costs, technological considerations could
never explain the existence of a firm or an existing firm’s decision to
268
integrate.
These departures from perfect competition differed from those
Coase invoked in another way as well. Unlike bargaining and
information costs, some of these departures could actually enhance the
welfare of consumers and the rest of society, by inducing an allocation of
resources superior to that produced by atomistic rivalry. For instance, the
specialized equipment in Coase’s original unpublished example could
produce a differentiated input that the purchaser could in turn use to

264. See supra note 197 (explaining how one might characterize these as “second order transaction
costs”).
265. See Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, supra note 207, at 26 (contending that
pervasive transaction costs render externality and market failure ubiquitous); Williamson, supra note
66, at 103–30 (“Vertical integration . . . is more consistent with transaction cost economizing than
with . . . alternatives.”); Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, supra note 239, at 20 (“[A]
presumption of market failure is warranted where it is observed that transactions are shifted out of a
market and into a firm . . . .”).
266. See Knight, supra note 35, at 78–79 (excluding preying of individuals on one another by fiat).
267. Cf. Williamson, supra note 66, at 86–90 (explaining why technological considerations
generally cannot explain vertical integration); Goldberg, supra note 214, at 396–97 (contending that
price theory errs in assuming that production costs are unrelated to institutional arrangements,
including ownership of relevant inputs).
268. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 86–90; Goldberg, supra note 214, at 397 (explaining that
technical economies cannot explain the boundaries of the firm because, absent transaction costs, such
economies can “be achieved equally well if the factors of production are owned by independent
individuals”).
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produce a differentiated product for sale to consumers. Moreover, a
firm that produced a differentiated product could thereby enhance
270
consumer welfare by better catering to unique tastes and preferences.
Even doctrinaire price theorists had recognized that product
differentiation, though a departure from perfect competition, could
actually enhance the welfare of consumers, despite accompanying market
271
power.
Under these accounts, then, complete and partial integration did far
more than simply reduce the cost of identifying and bargaining with
suppliers. Instead, such restraints altered the institutional framework in
which economic activity took place, thereby changing incentives and the
ultimate content of economic activity, such as price, output, and the
272
quality thereof. Like the rationale for integration Coase identified in
1937, this explanation does not rest upon any assumption that the
restraint exercised market power by reducing output, or increasing price
273
above costs. Moreover, this change was for the better, as it entailed
various forms of activity that antitrust policy encourages.

III. A Transaction Cost Critique of the Rule of Reason
Standard
As explained earlier, antitrust law and enforcement policy at one
time reflected significant hostility toward non-standard contracts,
hostility derived from price theory’s partial equilibrium trade-off
274
paradigm. This hostility manifested itself as declarations that various
non-standard contracts were unlawful per se, or nearly so. The work of
several scholars identifying various transaction costs and contractual
solutions thereto influenced courts and agencies, causing both to
275
abandon per se treatment of numerous restraints. In particular, courts
have held that many non-standard contracts, while restrictive of atomistic

269. Langlois, supra note 47, at 7–8, 11–14 (explaining how asset-specificity can deepen
specialization, enhance productivity, and create unique capabilities).
270. See sources cited supra note 41 (collecting authorities contending that product differentiation
can increase product variety and thus consumer welfare).
271. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
272. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, at 717–18 (arguing that background rules
construct an institutional framework that impacts the allocation of resources).
273. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining Coase’s assertion that his theory of the
firm was independent of market power considerations).
274. See supra notes 63–86 and accompanying text (describing the so-called “inhospitality era” of
antitrust law and the partial equilibrium paradigm that drove it).
275. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997) (reversing the per se ban on maximum resale
price maintenance); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98–104 (1985)
(holding that certain restraints on price and output should be analyzed under the rule of reason);
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (reversing the per se ban on non-price
vertical restraints); see also Meese, supra note 29, at 141–44 (recounting the influence of transaction
cost reasoning on antitrust law during this period).
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competition, might nonetheless be necessary to produce benefits treated
276
as cognizable under the antitrust laws. Such benefits, it should be
noted, were distinct from technological benefits, such as economies of
277
scale and product differentiation, that courts had previously recognized.
In some cases, courts and scholars recognized cognizable benefits
similar to those identified by Coase, that is, the reduction of bargaining
278
and information costs. Indeed, some scholars believe these “mundane”
279
costs to be the more important determinant of vertical integration.
More often, however, courts and scholars have relied upon assertions
280
that such restraints can reduce non-technological transaction costs. A
finding that a restraint may reduce either sort of cost obviates per se
condemnation, since such restraints no longer lack redeeming virtue,
which is a necessary element of per se condemnation under the Sherman
281
Act.
In holding that non-standard contracts could produce “redeeming
virtues,” courts recognized that arrangements inconsistent with the
conditions of perfect competition could enhance the welfare of
282
consumers, even if they might lead to market power. Still, recognition
of such efficiencies as cognizable and relevant to antitrust analysis does
not ensure that agencies and courts would properly evaluate such
276. See Meese, supra note 29, at 141–44 (documenting the influence of transaction cost reasoning
upon various per se rules); see also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54 (“Vertical restrictions . . . achieve certain
efficiencies in the distribution of [manufacturers’] products. These ‘redeeming virtues’ are implicit in
every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason.”).
277. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
278. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1979) (invoking the
propensity of restraint to reduce bargaining and information costs as a rationale for rule of reason
treatment); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at 378 (describing numerous such costs firms may
reduce via vertical integration); Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking,
26 J.L. & Econ. 497, 538–40 (1983) (explaining how certain tying contracts could reduce search costs);
cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 43–44 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that a contract’s propensity to reduce monitoring and search costs militated against rule of
reason condemnation).
279. See generally Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs, 27 Org.
Stud. 1389 (2006) (arguing that these types of transaction costs provide a better understanding of the
evolving relationship between markets and firms).
280. See e.g., Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51–57 (relying upon scholarly articles invoking transaction cost
to identify benefits of vertical restraints); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792
F.2d 210, 221–23 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189–90 (7th Cir.
1985).
281. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (holding that a restraint is
unlawful per se if it always, or almost always, is anticompetitive and always, or almost always, lacks
“redeeming virtue” (quoting N. Pac. RR. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958))).
282. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984) (finding that
cooperation that “differentiates” college football from other sports produces cognizable benefits); id.
at 103 (explaining how restraint on rivalry in one part of the market could enhance overall welfare);
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56 n.25 (finding that intrabrand restraints can facilitate promotion conveying
information about differentiated products); id. at 55 (noting that a “purely competitive situation”
might result in insufficient promotion).
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agreements under the rule of reason. Indeed, as explained earlier, lower
courts and scholars have offered competing approaches to rule of reason
283
analysis.
What, though, about the approach to rule of reason analysis taken
by the Supreme Court and enforcement agencies, with its singular focus
284
on price or output within the partial equilibrium framework? Both
presume that a restraint is unlawful if it results in higher prices or lower
285
output. Moreover, once this presumption arises, courts and agencies
ask whether any benefits of the restraint “outweigh” or “offset” the
perceived harms, by reducing prices or preventing their increase as
286
compared to the pre-restraint baseline, for instance. If, despite these
benefits, the restraint still leads to a higher price, courts and agencies
conclude that the agreement is an exercise of market power to the
287
detriment of consumers. Leading scholars have endorsed this approach,
which the Harvard School began to articulate and embrace in the early
288
1980s.
Will this approach separate harmful contracts from those that are
beneficial? To answer this question, this Part will compare and contrast
current law’s treatment of two different sorts of restraints, each of which
reduces the cost of transacting, broadly-defined, albeit in different ways.
As will be seen, current law properly declines to condemn restraints that
reduce technological transaction costs without creating market power. At
the same time, even if properly applied, current law seems to condemn
restraints that significantly reduce non-technological transaction costs,
even though such restraints avoid per se condemnation precisely because
they might reduce such costs.

283. Compare Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 188–91 (proof that defendants possess market power is a
necessary ingredient of any rule of reason claim), and Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 19–23 (1984) (contending, inter alia, that absence of market power should doom a
plaintiff’s case under the rule of reason), with Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[A]n actual adverse effect on competition . . . arguably is more direct evidence of market power than
calculations of elusive market share figures.”), and Mark Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in
Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 38–45 (2000)
(contending that proof of anticompetitive harm should suffice to establish a prima facie case regardless
of market power).
284. See supra notes 99–118 and accompanying text.
285. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–11; AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.3; see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459–63 (1986) (holding that proof of detrimental effects suffices to establish
prima facie case).
286. See supra notes 116, 121 and accompanying text (describing the requirement that courts
“balance” a restraint’s benefits against presumed harms).
287. See supra notes 109–10, 113–14 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 48, 111 and accompanying text.
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A. Two Examples of Transaction Cost Reduction
Consider two different restraints that may reduce transaction costs.
First, a small firm may integrate backward by purchasing a supplier to
289
reduce the cost of discovering inputs and haggling over terms of trade.
Second, consider a more complicated story, drawn from an actual case,
whereby rivals and potential rivals in the grocery business form a joint
venture to develop and produce products similar (but not identical) to
290
those already sold by members in competition with each other. Assume
further that the venture sells its product to these rivals who in turn
distribute the output to consumers, and that such distribution requires
291
product-specific promotional expenditures. Moreover, assume that the
new venture assigns rivals exclusive territories where they may distribute
292
the venture’s output. Finally, assume that this arrangement prevents
venture members from free riding on each other’s promotional
expenditures and thus, ensures that each venture member expends
293
optimal resources on promotion. In this way, one can say, the venture
ensures that members’ promotional activity replicates that of a fully
294
integrated firm producing the same product. Absent such restraints, the
venture might produce the new product, but no one would promote it.
Both of these arrangements reduce the cost of relying upon the
market—conceived at the highest level of generality—to conduct
295
economic activity. Still, they do so in very different ways. The first—
backwards integration to reduce information and haggling costs—
impacts only one relevant variable: the pre-transaction technological cost
of discovering and negotiating with trading partners. Thus, the restraint
reduces the cost of producing unchanged output that postdates the
transaction, a reduction analogous to a reduction in production costs
289. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390–91 (emphasizing these sorts of costs); see
also Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at 378 (describing, in intricate detail, various bargaining and
information costs that firms may seek to avoid by means of vertical integration).
290. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 602–05 (1972). The Topco venture produced
numerous “private label” products for sale in venture members’ stores. United States v. Topco
Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Thus, venture members sought to replicate the
private label offerings of vertically-integrated rivals. See id at 1033–35.
291. Cf. Telser, supra note 196, at 89 (providing a benevolent account of minimum RPM that
assumes dealers’ services are specific to the manufacturer’s product).
292. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 607–11 (evaluating such a venture).
293. See Bork, supra note 196, at 429–39 (explaining how such restraints can facilitate promotion in
this manner); see also Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1042–43 (finding that horizontal territorial restraints
ancillary to a legitimate joint venture facilitated and encouraged promotional expenditures to the
ultimate benefit of consumers).
294. See Bork, supra note 196, at 434–36 (explaining how such restraints can replicate promotional
expenditures by a fully-integrated firm).
295. I do not mean to suggest that contractual integration always produces significant economic
benefits. Nor do I assume that such restraints never produce economic harm. I mean only to employ
an example of a restraint that plainly produces significant benefits without any offsetting harm as a
means of illustrating the current law’s inadequacy at dealing with such restraints.
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caused by, say, a realization of economies of scale. An economist would
model this particular reduction in transaction costs within the partial
297
equilibrium framework by shifting the firm’s cost curve downward. Nor
is there any reason to suspect that the transaction will alter the demand
schedule for the product in question. As a result, output of the same,
unchanged product would rise and price would fall compared to the
status quo ante, that is, a baseline consisting of the price and output that
existed before the integration. Moreover, removal of the restraint would
lead to higher prices and reduced output.
Thus, a plaintiff challenging this first restraint could not make out a
prima facie case, unless it could demonstrate that the defendant
possesses market power as a result of the transaction—a prospect
298
excluded by the facts. Even if the plaintiff could somehow establish
that the defendant possesses market power, the defendant could
nonetheless prevail by demonstrating that the restraint in fact reduced
299
prices compared to the status quo ante. In short, the dominant rule of
reason test, informed as it is by the partial equilibrium trade-off model,
would produce accurate assessments of the impact of this form of
integration.
The impact of the second arrangement and its resulting fate under
the current test is more difficult to trace. For one thing, the restraint in
question does not exist in a vacuum, but is, instead, part of a larger effort
to create and market a new product and significantly to alter the
economic status quo ante. This effort will involve specific investments in
creating and producing a new product, product differentiation,
advertising expenditures (which also constitute specific investments), and
the passage of time between investments and their expected payoff.
Moreover, the investment and subsequent promotion of the new product
create conditions that are ripe for opportunism, in this case free riding by
rivals on the sunk promotional expenditures of other members of the
300
venture. Finally, the transaction and the accompanying restraint have
no impact on the engineering considerations that impact technological

296. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
297. See Williamson, Antitrust Defense, supra note 55, at 21; cf. Bain, supra note 31, at 357
(describing how certain instances of vertical integration purportedly reduce technological production
costs).
298. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that proof of
market power is an alternate vehicle for establishing a prima facie case under the rule of reason);
AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.31, at 12 (“In some cases, however, a determination of anticompetitive harm
may be informed by a consideration of market power.”).
299. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984); AGCC,
supra note 99, § 3.35, at 22 n.50.
300. Indeed, the district court in Topco found that unrestrained rivalry between venture members
would result in such free riding. See 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1040–43 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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production costs in the perfect competition model. Indeed, the whole
point of the restraints is to alter background “rules of the game,” so as to
induce venture partners to expend more resources on promotion—that
is, to increase the overall venture’s technological unit cost of production
and distribution when compared to the expenditures that would be in
302
place before the restraint. Moreover, unlike the first transaction, which
merely impacts the supply side of the market, by altering the costs of
producing an unchanged product, these challenged restraints would also
impact the demand side. By facilitating creation of a new product and
inducing venture partners to make additional promotional investments,
the restraints would attract new customers and induce current customers
303
to purchase additional products from the manufacturer at a given price.
Economists model the impact of promotion and product differentiation
as an outward shift in the demand schedule for the product in question,
as well as a change in the slope of the curve to reflect less elastic
304
demand.
By hypothesis, the venture creates a new product and thus, serves
305
Moreover, the restraint encourages
the interests of consumers.
promotion of this product, which may compete with those sold by larger,
completely integrated rivals, who achieve the same amount of promotion
306
unilaterally. Nothing about this account depends upon the restraint
inducing the exercise of market power, aside from that associated with
product differentiation, which of course does not offend the antitrust
307
laws. In short, this is the exact sort of conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect and encourage, namely, economic integration

301. See supra notes 68, 165 and accompanying text (collecting authorities treating the production
function as based upon “engineering considerations”).
302. Several scholars have recognized that beneficial vertical restraints such as exclusive territories
will induce dealers bound by such agreements to incur additional costs of promotion and thus, to seek
to increase the price they can charge for the product in question. See William F. Baxter, The Viability
of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 933, 945–46 (1987); Telser, supra note 196, at 91; see
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J. 135, 156
(1984) (“Every argument about restricted dealing implies that the restrictions influence price. There is
no such thing as a free lunch; the manufacturer can’t get the dealer to do more without increasing the
dealer’s margin.”); Meese, supra note 29, at 152–61 (applying this logic to horizontal restraints).
303. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 196, at 429–39; see also Meese, supra note 29, at 158–61 (explaining
how such restraints can facilitate product differentiation).
304. See Telser, supra note 196, at 89–90 (portraying the impact of RPM in this manner).
305. Cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–02 (1984) (holding that
horizontal restraints that facilitate creation of differentiated product are properly analyzed under the
rule of reason); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 13–16 (1979) (finding that
restraint’s creation of a new product prevents summary condemnation).
306. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1035, 1039–41 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
307. Cf. AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.36(a) (stating that agencies will not credit purported efficiencies
requiring anticompetitive output reductions).
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reallocating resources to facilitate interbrand competition and enhance
308
society’s welfare.
Still, such a restraint would not survive scrutiny under the rule of
reason standards articulated by most courts and the agencies. To begin
with, the restraint apparently produces the sort of “actual detrimental
effects” that give rise to a prima facie case, by resulting in higher prices
and/or lower output when compared to the baseline that courts currently
employ. If successful, the restraint will facilitate promotion and product
differentiation and cause the price of the venture product to rise as
compared to products sold by venture members before the venture.
Moreover, once the venture begins selling the new product to its
members, who in turn incur significant promotional expenses,
subsequent removal of the restraint will increase short term rivalry
between venture members and thus increase output and reduce prices,
thereby suggesting that enforcement of the restraint increased prices and
309
reduced output. Indeed, for some restraints, mere proof that the
310
restraint exists would suffice to establish such a case.
Moreover, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a
defendant can only prevail by showing that the restraint produces
significant benefits that manifest themselves as prices that are lower than
311
those that would exist without the restraint. However, the benefits of
the restraint—encouraging promotion and product differentiation—will
manifest themselves as higher prices compared to the baselines that
courts and the agencies employ, quashing any effort to rebut the prima
312
facie case. Thus, the current rule of reason framework, informed by the

308. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15–16 (1997) (noting that interbrand competition is the
primary concern of antitrust); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100–02 (finding that a restraint’s facilitation of
product differentiation is a redeeming virtue); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56
n.25 (1977) (noting that promotion of a differentiated product conveys useful information); see also
Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction
Cost Approach, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953, 987–88 (1979) (explaining how non-standard agreements that
reduce transaction costs facilitate efficient allocation of resources).
309. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–08 (finding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case by
“showing” that removal of the restraint would reduce prices).
310. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. Indeed, one former head of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice opined that the mere existence of a restraint such as the one
posited here would itself establish a prima facie case. See Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of
Justice, A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements, Address Before the
American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy Program 5 & n.8 (Nov. 7,
1996), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches. The former head of the Federal Trade
Commission reached a similar result. See Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint
Ventures, 74 Geo. L.J. 1605, 1621 (1986) (concluding that Topco restraints were properly condemned
because defendants could have achieved the same objectives in a different manner).
311. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
312. Cf. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114 (“If the NCAA’s television plan produced procompetitive
efficiencies, the plan would increase output and reduce the price of televised games. The District
Court’s contrary findings accordingly undermine petitioner’s position.”).
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partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, would unambiguously condemn
such restraints, which in fact create no harm and produce only benefits
treated as cognizable under the antitrust laws.
B. The Source of the Hostility
What explains current law’s unjustified hostility toward certain
restraints that reduce transaction costs? After all, both forms of vertical
integration detailed above “reduce transaction costs.” Both do so by
changing background rules—the institutional framework—to reduce the
313
“cost” of relying upon atomistic markets to conduct economic activity.
By altering the framework in this way, both also alter the content of
314
future activity and the resulting allocation of society’s resources. Both
alter this content “for the better,” that is, they attenuate market failure
315
so as to enhance the allocation of resources. Finally, antitrust courts
have repeatedly stated that such benefits are cognizable, or with the
result that a plausible claim that a restraint will produce them avoids per
316
Nonetheless, as explained above, current law,
se condemnation.
informed as it is by the partial equilibrium trade-off model, would
condemn one such restraint and others like it.
There is, however, an important conceptual difference between
these two restraints and the transactions they accompany, a difference
that accounts for this disparate treatment. The “market failure” solved
by the first restraint manifests itself in higher pre-transaction
technological costs of discovery and haggling. This “failure” is no
different in some sense from the “failure” that occurs when a firm elects
to purchase inputs from a supplier with higher costs of producing the
317
input than its own. Thus, a decision to abandon the market to reduce
these transaction costs seems indistinguishable from the classic rationale
for vertical integration recognized by price theory’s partial equilibrium
trade-off model, namely, the realization of technical economies that alter
318
the firm’s production function as compared to the status quo ante.
313. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, at 715–17.
314. Id. at 717–18 (explaining how a contractual or legal change in background rules can alter the
content of economic activity).
315. See Baxter, supra note 302, at 947–48 (arguing that vertical restraints overcome market
failures and enhance the allocation of resources); Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 32, at 68
(arguing that non-standard contracts are often essential to fostering competition); Meese, supra note
29, at 134–41 (explaining how non-standard contracts can overcome market failure and improve
welfare); Williamson, supra note 308, at 988–89 (“Organizational changes that give rise to [transaction
costs savings] will, if not accompanied by offsetting price distortions, invariably yield social gains.”).
316. See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–57 (1976).
317. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text; see also Dahlman, supra note 191, at 144–46.
318. See Bain, supra note 31, at 357; Stigler, The Theory of Price, supra note 211, at 168–71
(referring to Stigler, Division of Labor, supra note 211); see also Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at
128–29 (noting that a merger can alter the extent of vertical integration to account for technological
changes); supra note 173 and accompanying text (detailing classic technological account of vertical
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This first class of efficiencies finds easy recognition within the pricetheoretic merger trade-off paradigm and the doctrinal framework that
319
this paradigm informs. To be precise, such restraints purport to alter
only one variable as compared to the equilibrium status quo ante,
320
namely, the cost of identifying and bargaining with an input supplier.
The restraints do not depend upon or accompany relationship-specific
investments or other efforts to differentiate a firm’s product. Moreover,
such restraints do not contemplate promotional efforts to enhance
consumers’ demand for the newly-differentiated product. While such
restraints do overcome a sort of “market failure,” the failure does not, as
do various forms of opportunism, manifest itself as a pre-restraint
disequilibrium, that is, specific investments without safeguards against
321
opportunism.
In these circumstances, then, the price charged by the defendants
before the adoption of the restraint can serve as a useful baseline for
assessing the impact of a restraint that purports to reduce these
transaction costs. It makes perfect sense to treat the equilibrium price
that existed before the restraint as “competitive,” or at least as
competitive as antitrust regulation can expect, namely, workably
322
competitive. Moreover, in those cases in which one cannot determine
the pre-restraint price, it makes sense for a court simply to perform a
straightforward thought experiment—that is, to ask whether, after
consummation of the transaction, the defendants would charge a lower
323
or higher price if the transaction were reversed. If removal of the
restraint would increase prices, such an increase would indicate that

integration).
319. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (explaining how the merger trade-off example
served as a paradigm informing antitrust policy).
320. Cf. Bain, supra note 54, at 14–15 (explaining that price theory “does not investigate very well
the implications of changing determinants” of different equilibria and economic performance).
321. Cf. Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants, supra note 256, at 356–57 (explaining that
opportunistic exploitation of relationship–specific investments “is not a long-run equilibrium
phenomenon”); see also infra notes 356–58 and accompanying text (explaining how pre-restraint prices
do not always constitute an equilibrium relevant to antitrust analysis, where the restraint prevents
opportunism).
322. Cf. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019–20 (10th Cir. 1998) (assuming implicitly that a price
existing before the restraint was competitive in this sense); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d
667, 673–74 (7th Cir. 1992) (same). As Oliver Williamson noted, application of the partial equilibrium
trade-off model to mergers does not require assumption that pre-merger prices were perfectly
competitive. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev.
699, 712 (1977) (“[M]erging parties’ possession of] [p]reexisting market power . . . may be introduced
easily into the basic model.”); cf. id. at 706–07 & n.25 (explaining that the basic model assumes that
merging firms are duopolists, and that threat of entry keeps pre-merger prices at a competitive level).
323. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104–09 (1984) (relying
upon the district court’s finding that removal of challenged restraints would reduce prices and increase
output); see also id. at 89–90 (recounting how parties had adopted similar restraints in the early 1950s
and enforced them throughout).
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lower transaction costs more than offset any market power effects, while
a lower price upon removal would indicate that the restriction created
324
power that overwhelmed any efficiencies. Thus, while these restraints
produce benefits supposedly not recognized by workable competition’s
trade-off model, that model in fact has no difficulty recognizing and
incorporating such efficiencies within its central tool for evaluating trade
325
practices. Like Newtonian mechanics, which produces useful results
despite unrealistic assumptions, the partial equilibrium trade-off model
can evaluate restraints that reduce certain forms of transaction costs,
326
even while modeling them as changes in technology.
By contrast, the second sort of arrangement produces non327
technological efficiencies. These restraints have no impact on the
underlying “engineering” cost of production. Moreover, such restraints
do not arise in a vacuum, but accompany larger efforts to improve the
economic status quo ante by manipulating variables other than the cost of
production. For instance, as assumed above, such a restraint might
accompany investments designed to alter the product the defendants
328
Indeed, such restraints may
were selling before the restraint.
themselves facilitate and encourage the creation of a new product, as
when members of a college sports league agree among themselves not to
pay student-athletes a salary, thereby preserving the amateur quality of
329
the product. Moreover, such restraints often facilitate promotional
efforts that alter consumer preferences and shift the demand schedule for
330
the defendants’ product and alter its slope. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the various specific investments that such restraints

324. See id. at 114 (noting that the district court’s finding that restraints resulted in prices higher
than those that would exist without them undermined defendants’ claim of benefits).
325. Cf. Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 78 (explaining how the incumbent
paradigm resists challenges by adjusting itself through “numerous articulations and ad hoc
modifications” to incorporate seemingly contradictory evidence).
326. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1706 (1986)
(“Newton’s model of gravitation assumes a perfect vacuum. There aren’t any perfect vacuums in this
universe, but the model is still pretty useful—and it is useful even though Einstein showed it to be
wrong. Newtonian dynamics, flawed as they are, give very good approximations for practical use by
people sending Voyager 2 to Neptune or baseballs to home plate.”).
327. See supra Parts II.B (defining and discussing “technological transaction costs”) and II.C
(defining non-technological transaction costs).
328. See supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (stating that
contractual restrictions on horizontal rivalry were necessary to differentiate the NCAA’s product from
minor league sports); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (finding that defendants would not
have formed their venture without assurance provided by exclusive territories).
329. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100–02 (1984) (holding that horizontal agreement on players’ salaries
would avoid summary condemnation because unbridled rivalry would result in the degeneration of
“amateur” football, associated with an academic tradition, to the equivalent of semi-pro football);
Meese, supra note 29, at 158.
330. See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports, 961 F.2d at 675–76.
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accompany require the passage of time, thereby enhancing the risk of
331
opportunism. Such opportunism takes place when property rights are
poorly specified, thereby providing incentives for some parties to exploit
investments made by others, resulting in a disequilibrium allocation of
332
resources, at least in the short run.
The absence of well-specified property rights is itself a departure
333
from the assumptions of perfect and workable competition. Such
restraints survive per se condemnation precisely because they may
overcome the sort of market failure that poorly-specified property rights
334
may induce. By changing background rules, the restraints help create
the well-defined property rights that perfect and workable competition
assume in the first place, a right in the fruits of members’ promotional
335
expenditures. The existence of the rights will, of course, encourage
promotion—a form of output—thereby facilitating product
336
differentiation. Indeed, it may even encourage the formation of the
337
venture in the first place. Thus, this second type of restraint has no
impact on the technological costs of production, but instead, helps alter
what firms choose to produce, how much they choose to promote it, and
338
what consumers choose to buy.

331. See, e.g., id. at 673–75 (explaining how the restraint accompanied the league’s successful
multi-year effort to enhance the attractiveness of its product vis à vis other entertainment and how, in
1980 and 1981, the league was so unpopular that the league championship was only televised on tape
delay).
332. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. Econ.
Hist. 16, 22–25 (1973) (describing how a system of private property can transform a communal good
characterized by underproduction into a private good); Demsetz, supra note 263, at 348–49 (discussing
how well-defined property rights cause owners to internalize the social costs and benefits of their
actions).
333. See Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 11–15 (2d ed. 1997); see also
Hayek, supra note 47, at 110–11 (“That a functioning market presupposes not only prevention of
violence and fraud but the protection of certain rights, such as property, and the enforcement of
contracts, is always taken for granted.”).
334. See supra notes 87–94, 314–16 and accompanying text (explaining how restraints survive per
se condemnation for this reason).
335. See Bork, supra note 251, at 956 (suggesting that RPM confers the equivalent of property
rights on dealers); Meese, supra note 250, at 595–607; cf. Michael J. Trebilcock, The Common Law
of Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis 252–53 (1986) (explaining that restrictive
covenants enable business owners to realize the benefits of expected returns from investment in
goodwill in the sale price of a business, by granting limited property rights in these assets to the
purchaser).
336. See supra notes 244–52 and accompanying text; see also Robert H. Bork, A Reply to
Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 Yale L.J. 731, 733–34 (1967) (discussing how promotional
expenditures are indistinguishable from other forms of output).
337. See Meese, supra note 29, at 158 (explaining how the availability of efficient distribution
devices may encourage firms to create and market new products).
338. See Bork, supra note 336, at 733–34 (describing how promotion can differentiate a product);
Meese, supra note 29, at 158–60 (explaining how such non-standard contracts can facilitate product
differentiation).
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Given these characteristics of restraints that produce nontechnological efficiencies, it should come as no surprise that the test
applied under current law—based upon the partial equilibrium trade-off
model—does not accurately appraise the impact of such restraints. Recall
that the partial equilibrium model assumes well-specified property rights,
production of an unchanged product, instantaneous market equilibria,
constant demand for the defendants’ product, and the absence of
opportunism and other externalities. The model also assumes that only
the state can eliminate externalities, via state ownership or
339
rearrangement of state-created property rights. In this way, the model
exemplifies Joe Bain’s observation, consistent with Frank Knight’s
definition of perfect competition, that price theory investigates mainly
“what performance would be with some given and fixed set of
determinants, after some sort of stable balance or regular pattern of
behavior has been reached in a given situation” and thus, does not
340
“investigate very much the implications of changing determinants.” At
most the model recognizes two sorts of changes: economies of scale and
enhanced market power.
Take current law’s methods of determining whether a restraint
341
results in “actual detrimental effects.” Under one of these methods,
courts take a historical approach, asking whether the defendants’ prices
are higher, or output is lower, after the restraint than they were
342
beforehand, without adjusting prices, or output, for product quality.
This approach—entirely consistent with the partial equilibrium model—
assumes that price and output charged before the imposition of the
restraint reflected an equilibrium and that demand for the product
343
remains constant before and after the restraint. In this scenario, a new
equilibrium of higher prices, or lower output, would readily indicate that
the restraint facilitates the collective exercise of market power. Other
explanations have been excluded by hypothesis.
However, the assumptions that undergird the application of the
partial equilibrium model make no sense in this context. Once a
defendant offers a plausible claim that a restraint produces nontechnological efficiencies, there is no reason to assume that the prerestraint price reflects a non-harmful or “competitive” benchmark the
exceeding of which indicates an exercise of market power. Instead, it
339. See Meese, supra note 68, at 80 (stating that during the inhospitality era, economists assumed
that only legal reform, and not market contracting, would overcome market failure and thus,
externalities).
340. See Bain, supra note 54, at 14; see also Knight, supra note 35, at 79 (stating that the perfect
competition model assumes that “given factors and conditions are . . . to remain absolutely
unchanged”).
341. See supra notes 102, 126 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 102–03, 126 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 56, 102–03, 126 and accompanying text.
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seems just as plausible to assume that the pre-restraint price reflects a
non-optimal combination of product quality, promotion, or both, as well
344
as externalities, that is, a risk of opportunism. In these circumstances,
one could say that, contrary to assumptions undergirding price theory,
the restraint will change state-created background rules. This change will
improve upon imperfect property rights, which in turn will facilitate a
joint venture and associated promotion that will reallocate resources and
thereby alter the content of economic activity, as compared to the prerestraint baseline embraced by the partial equilibrium trade-off model.
Thus, any apparent “increase” in price would have absolutely nothing to
do with the collective exercise of market power, but would instead reflect
a new, more efficient equilibrium brought about by the venture, product
345
differentiation, and the accompanying restraint.
What, however, about the other method of determining the impact
of a restraint on prices or output—namely a thought experiment whereby
the tribunal simply asks whether, if the restraint were removed, the
346
defendants’ price would fall and output would rise? Such a hypothetical
reduction in price and increase in output would indicate that imposition
and enforcement of the restraint caused higher prices and reduced
output. This approach would seem superior to a simple comparison of
pre- and post-restraint prices, since this latter approach controls for
specific investments, product differentiation, and promotion by ignoring
pre-restraint prices. Thus, it would seem, such an approach to
determining actual detrimental effects will isolate the impact upon price
or output, and any market power effects, of the restraint itself, thereby
correcting for the shortcomings of the historical approach.
Nonetheless, closer analysis reveals the flaw in this latter approach
that produces the erroneous results described earlier. The outcome of a
thought experiment is only as good as the implicit model that informs it.
Here, that model suffers from various shortcomings that undermine the
results of any thought experiment that relies upon it. Assume that the
venture and the accompanying restraints have their intended impact,
namely, specific investments in product creation and promotion, as well
as a differentiated, well-promoted product. Assume that, subsequently,
the parties involuntarily drop the restraint. Venture members will invade
each others’ former territories, enhancing rivalry in the sale of venture
347
products. Such rivalry will reduce prices and increase output. To the
tribunal schooled in “rudimentary economics” and the application of the

344. See Meese, supra note 29, at 146–48.
345. See supra notes 41, 82–86 and accompanying text (explaining how product differentiation
does not offend the antitrust laws and, in fact, benefits consumers).
346. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 105–06 (1984).
347. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (assuming that restraint’s
removal would have such an effect, even if “members may indeed ‘cut each other’s throats’”).
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partial equilibrium paradigm, these changes in price and output would
reflect the natural impact of competition tempering an exercise of market
power—a movement from an anticompetitive equilibrium, imposed by the
348
restraint, to a non-restraint equilibrium that is more “competitive.”
Judged against this purportedly “competitive” baseline, then, the restraint
apparently exercises market power and harms consumers.
This tribunal would be wrong. Instead of reflecting the salutary
impact of competition upon market power, the price reduction imagined
by this thought experiment would instead reflect inefficient opportunistic
behavior by firms entering their partners’ erstwhile exclusive territories.
Nothing in the scenario hypothesized depended upon a market structure
conferring market power upon the defendants, even after the venture.
Moreover, the restraint by hypothesis induced expenditures that, by their
nature, would be sunk, that is, not useful in connection with other
349
economic endeavors. Finally, these expenditures would differentiate
the product and enhance consumer demand, resulting in higher prices.
A firm that entered a partner’s exclusive territories after removal of
a restraint would presumably abjure promotional expenditures, choosing
instead to exploit the incumbent’s sunk promotional investments, free
350
riding on those expenditures already made. The new entrant could thus
profitably underprice the incumbent, forcing it to match the prices
charged by the entrant to remain in the marketplace. While the
incumbent would suffer an accounting loss “on paper,” such prices would
minimize its losses, given that the costs of promotion are sunk and thus,
351
independent of the incumbent’s price or output. Removal of the
restraint would thereby result in higher output and reduced prices for the
venture product, at least in the short run. Once the entrant has fully
exploited the incumbent’s promotional investments, however, the
352
incumbent will refuse to make additional investments of the same sort.
Moreover, the entrant itself will also refuse to make such investments.
As a result, demand for the venture’s product will fall over the longer
run, both output and prices will fall, and the entire venture may become
unprofitable and shut down.
Thus, while removal of the restraint would reduce the defendant’s
prices and increase output, thereby suggesting that the restraint itself
increases prices and reduces output, this prediction would not suggest
348. Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999) (explaining that courts should rely
upon “a rudimentary understanding of economics” when determining whether a restraint, on its face,
establishes a prima facie case).
349. See Klein, supra note 196, at 298–300 (describing the connection between sunk costs and
opportunism).
350. Cf. Telser, supra note 196, at 87–91.
351. Klein et al., supra note 196, at 299 (explaining how reducing prices below sunk costs will not
reduce the exploited party’s output).
352. See Telser, supra note 196, at 91.
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that the restraint constitutes an exercise of market power, that is, the
353
ability to raise price above cost by restricting output. Instead, higher
prices associated with the restraint could just as well reflect the cost of
354
additional, efficient promotion induced by the agreement. Nor would
the price reduction or output increase imagined by the thought
experiment be “pro-competitive.” Instead, the price reduction or output
increase would reflect rivals’ opportunistic exploitation of productspecific promotional investment and below-cost pricing by the defendant.
The prevention of such exploitation is, by hypothesis, the rationale for
rejecting per se condemnation in favor of rule of reason treatment in the
355
first place. Far from reflecting a more “competitive” price and output
than that produced by the restraint, then, such exploitation and resulting
lower price is the result of two departures from perfect (and workable)
competition: the poor specification of property rights and opportunistic
356
behavior—an externality— by venture members. This state of affairs is
not an equilibrium or a stable solution that can provide a valid baseline
against which to measure the effects of the restraint for antitrust
357
purposes. Instead of reflecting a “competitive” or optimal mix of
economic variables, analogous to the workably “competitive” market
that animates the partial equilibrium trade-off model, this baseline
358
reflects an unsustainable combination of price, output, and promotion.
The “thought experiment” method of implementing current law
ignores specific investments, product differentiation, and possible
opportunism—all
non-technological
departures
from
perfect
competition. As a result, this method improperly interprets the imagined
price reduction and output increase following removal of the restraint as
evidence that the agreement enhances defendant’s market power and
produces prices and output that are “anticompetitive” compared to that

353. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981) (examining definition and measurement of market power relevant for
antitrust law).
354. See Meese, supra note 29, at 150–51.
355. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–57 (1977) (holding that the
propensity of a restraint to reduce opportunistic free riding is a cognizable benefit, saving the restraint
from per se condemnation).
356. Cf. Knight, supra note 35, at 78–79 (explaining that perfect competition model assumes that
individuals do not “prey upon” one another); Bowles & Gintis, supra note 69, at 84 (contending that
price theory and the perfect competition model rested upon assumption that all market actors behaved
as “Victorian gentlemen”); Makowski & Ostroy, supra note 69, at 490–91 (detailing the tendency of
some devotees of perfect competition to assume away possibility of opportunism by fiat).
357. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (explaining how the partial equilibrium trade-off
model assumes that pre-merger prices and output reflect stable equilibrium free of externality and
market failure).
358. See Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants, supra note 256, at 357 (explaining that
opportunistic exploitation of relationship-specific investments “is not a long-run equilibrium
phenomenon”); Langlois, supra note 47, at 11–12.
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which would occur upon removal of the restraint. In point of fact,
however, the non-restraint baseline that is supposedly more
“competitive” is entirely illusory—a state of affairs that parties would not
rationally have chosen in the first place, because the imagined prices and
output do not reflect the costs of production and associated promotion
360
anticipated by the joint venture. Parties’ failure to achieve this
inefficient non-equilibrium combination of price and output is not a
“harm” for antitrust purposes, any more than a firm’s failure to price
361
below cost. Internalization of an externality sometimes leads to higher
prices, and the Sherman Act does not require firms to adopt practices
that maintain externality and destroy wealth. Measurement and
“observation” are of little use if one does not know what one is looking
362
for, or simply asks the wrong question.
Take, now, the manner in which courts evaluate a defendant’s
argument that its restraint produces efficiencies that overcome the harm
presumed once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, in whatever
manner. Under current law, such an argument can only succeed if the
tribunal determines that, in fact, the restraint results in prices that are
lower, or at least no higher, than those that would exist without the
363
restraint. Indeed, courts have even gone so far as to hold that a
purported benefit is not even cognizable unless it tends to reduce prices
364
below the non-restraint level. This is the very same approach that
365
courts currently take in the merger context.
Such an approach would make perfect sense if defendants were
claiming that their restraints produced technological efficiencies in an
otherwise workably competitive market. In such cases the impact of a
restraint upon price would signal whether efficiencies outweighed market

359. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining that rule of reason analysis is premised
on a search for exercise of market power that harms consumers).
360. Cf. supra notes 334–38 and accompanying text (explaining how some restraints can allow
parties to capture the benefits of promotional investments and thereby increase promotional
expenditures).
361. See generally Alan J. Meese, Property, Aspen, and Refusals to Deal, 73 Antitrust L.J. 81
(2005) (arguing that the Sherman Act does not require monopolists to sell output to rivals below cost);
cf. Hayek, supra note 47, at 100 (asserting that economists should judge the impact of real world
rivalry by comparing results to those that could actually be obtained under alternative arrangements).
362. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science, in The
Essential Tension, supra note 58, at 178, 213 [hereinafter Kuhn, The Function of Measurement]
(contending that “‘[g]o ye forth and measure’ may well prove only an invitation to waste time,”
because “fruitful quantification” depends upon theoretical apparatus telling scientists what to look
for); id. at 193 (theory tells scientists what quantifiable facts to look for); see also Karl Popper, The
Logic of Scientific Discovery 88 (Routledge Classics, 2002) (1959) (stating that true science needs a
theoretical “point[] of view” to drive and inform its fact gathering).
363. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1983); AGCC,
supra note 99, § 3.37.
364. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978).
365. See Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 120, § 4.0.
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power effects to purchasers’ benefit. However, the markets in question
emphatically do not satisfy these assumptions, given the presence of
specific investments, poorly-specified property rights, opportunismrelated externalities, and market failure. Thus, the restraint produces
efficiencies that may manifest themselves as prices higher, and output
lower, than the pre-restraint baseline, or the price, or output, that would
obtain after removal of the restraint.
C. The Persistence of the Partial Equilibrium Paradigm
Current law’s continuing failure properly to consider nontechnological transaction costs may seem surprising. After all, the
Supreme Court recognized that non-standard agreements can produce
366
such “redeeming virtues” three decades ago, in the Sylvania decision.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly invoked the prospect of such
benefits to justify their refusal to declare various restraints unlawful per
367
se. Why, then, have these same actors simultaneously adopted a
method of rule of reason analysis destined to condemn so many of these
restraints?
For one thing, successful paradigms and the “mental sets” they
embody are persistent and resist change; such resistance is part of their
368
strength. Scientists, including social scientists, do not lightly abandon
an analytical apparatus that has served them well, by illuminating and
369
The partial
solving problems the discipline deems important.
equilibrium trade-off model and workable competition theory have
served industrial organization and antitrust well, by illuminating and
helping to solve a variety of antitrust problems by producing, or at least
suggesting, workable rules to address issues such as product
differentiation, mergers, internal expansion by monopolists, and
370
economies of scale in concentrated industries. Finally, Williamson’s

366. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54–57 (1977).
367. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
368. See Kuhn, The Essential Tension, supra note 58, at 225; id. at 232 (“[A] more flexible practice
will not produce the pattern of rapid consequential scientific advance to which recent centuries have
accustomed us. . . . Except under quite special circumstances, the practitioner of a mature science does
not pause to examine the divergent modes of explanation or experimentation.”); id. at 229 (explaining
how training that solidifies paradigms creates “mental sets” or “Einstellungen”); see also Kuhn,
Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 76–79 (entrenched paradigms resist change).
369. See Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 76 (“So long as the tools a paradigm
supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest and
penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear. As in
manufacture so in science—retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands
it.”); id. (adding that such retooling only occurs when there is a genuine scientific crisis); Kuhn, The
Function of Measurement, supra note 362, at 208–09 (noting that scientists cling to theories to which
they are committed as long as possible).
370. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text; see also Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra
note 58, at 23 (“Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in

Meese_62-HLJ-457.doc (Do Not Delete)

520

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/7/2011 12:18 PM

[Vol. 62:457

formalization of the model in the late 1960s, complete with a simple
graphical visualization, made the model and its conclusions accessible to
a much wider audience, facilitating its application by legal scholars and
371
practitioners.
Moreover, as explained earlier, Coase’s classic example of
transaction costs—bargaining and information costs—were closely
analogous to the sort of costs recognized by the partial equilibrium
372
paradigm. Scholars outside the context of industrial organization and
antitrust defined “transaction costs” in the same way, without reference
373
to opportunism or even integration. Thus, an enthusiastic recognition
that integration could reduce transaction costs did not, on its face, call
into question the utility of the partial equilibrium trade-off model, or the
antitrust tests that it spawned.
Even subsequent expansions of the transaction cost concept by
other scholars did not undermine any of the core conclusions of the
trade-off model or workable competition, neither of which had arisen to
evaluate non-standard agreements. It was Oliver Williamson, after all, a
modern proponent of TCE, who also refined the trade-off paradigm as a
374
vehicle for analyzing mergers that produce technological efficiencies.
TCE offered new explanations for agreements that workable
375
competition had explained as expressions of market power. These
explanations entered the antitrust policy debate during the same period
that scholars and policymakers expressed growing appreciation of the
propensity of mergers and internal expansion to generate efficiencies via
economies of scale, a propensity clarified by Williamson’s
376
formalization. Moreover, given the state of the law in the mid-1960s,
when scholars began to rediscover Coase’s insight and to identify new
transaction costs, the main question before the courts and scholars was
377
whether to expand or contract the scope of various per se rules.
Scholars and appellate courts could answer this question without

solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”).
371. See sources cited supra note 60; see also Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 381, 385–88 (1980) (invoking Williamson’s
partial equilibrium model to illustrate the possible trade-off between efficiency losses and gains in
merger to monopoly).
372. See supra notes 199–210 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
374. Williamson, Antitrust Defense, supra note 55.
375. See supra notes 180–98, 228–73.
376. See Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 89, at 273 (“[During the 1970s] the social
benefits of efficient resource allocation—to include the importance of [technological] economies as an
antitrust defense—became much more widely appreciated.”).
377. See, e.g., Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983) (delimiting the
scope of the per se rule against minimum RPM).
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determining how to conduct rule of reason analysis, which they often left
378
to trial courts and juries on remand.
Courts and scholars did turn to the content of rule of reason analysis
in the early 1980s, just a few years after transaction cost analysis achieved
its status as a competing paradigm for analyzing the antitrust implications
379
of partial and complete integration. At the same time, decisions
declaring partial integration subject to rule of reason analysis suggested
that any benefits produced by such restraints coexisted with
380
anticompetitive effects. It should come as no surprise, then, that
scholars constructing standards for conducting rule of reason analysis
would turn to (and extend) the very same paradigm used to evaluate
mergers, oligopolistic concentration, and unilateral expansion by
monopolists, a paradigm that readily handled transactions that both
381
enhanced market power and produced efficiencies. While application
of these standards produced anomalies and puzzles of the sort described
earlier, some lower courts have managed to avoid incorrect results by
adopting ad hoc modifications of the standard approach, thereby staving
off a crisis of confidence in the trade-off paradigm and slowing the
382
emergence of an alternative.
Moreover, post-TCE decisions that reached the Supreme Court did
not provide useful vehicles for recognizing the impact of TCE’s insights
upon the partial equilibrium paradigm. One case, for instance, involved a
restraint that avoided per se condemnation, because it reduced
bargaining and information costs, costs analogous to the sort of
378. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (remanding
without explaining how to conduct rule of reason analysis); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723–36 (1979) (affirming the lower court’s application of the rule of reason to
intrabrand restraint without elaborating on content of such analysis); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc. 433 U.S. 36 passim (1977) (same).
379. Dating the emergence of TCE as a competing paradigm would seem to be an inexact science.
It seems safe to say, however, that the paradigm had fully emerged by 1980, if not before. Between
1974 and 1980, for instance, several scholarly publications expressly applied the transaction cost
approach to discern the causes of complete and partial vertical integration. See, e.g., Williamson,
Markets and Hierarchies, supra note 239; Williamson, Economics of Antitrust, supra note 89; Klein,
Transaction Cost Determinants, supra note 256; Klein et al., supra note 196.
380. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 (explaining that courts conduct rule of reason analysis by
“weighing” various variables bearing on the impact of the restraint); id. at 57 n.27 (asserting that
courts can properly “balance” a restraint’s impact on intrabrand competition against the impact on
interbrand competition).
381. See Kuhn, The Essential Tension, supra note 58, at 233 (“[M]uch of the research undertaken
within a scientific tradition . . . [consists of] the extension of existing theory to areas that it is expected
to cover but in which it has never before been tried.”); see also supra notes 55–62 and accompanying
text.
382. See Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 78 (noting that a paradigm’s
practitioners adopt ad hoc modifications conforming theory with inconvenient facts); id. at 76 (opining
that practitioners only retool useful paradigms when crisis demands it); see also supra notes 141–46
and accompanying text (detailing efforts by lower courts to avoid implications of straightforward
application of standard model).
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technological production costs already recognized by the partial
383
equilibrium model. Another involved an assertion that purchasers
could not be trusted to make tradeoffs between price and quality, a
384
benefit the Court properly rejected as non-cognizable. Finally, in
NCAA, the Court rejected per se condemnation of the challenged
restraints on price and output, without identifying any particular
385
redeeming virtues the restraints might create. Thus, the Court’s
ensuing rule of reason analysis did not have to confront any assertion
386
that the restraint produced non-technological efficiencies. While the
Court has addressed numerous vertical restraints that could produce
non-technological benefits, it has in each such case simply rejected per se
condemnation without attempting to conduct its own rule of reason
387
analysis. Given the stickiness of paradigms, these cases did not result in
the sort of anomaly-driven crisis that would lead to a repudiation of the
partial equilibrium framework. Litigants hoping to undermine the
current test must select and frame cases in a manner that squarely
presents the conflict between the trade-off paradigm and the lessons of
TCE.
Finally, the law’s erroneous analysis of restraints that reduce nontechnological transaction costs likely flows from the intuitive assumption
that a restraint that reduces transaction costs, or otherwise produces
benefits, will tend to reduce prices when compared to a world with no
such restraint. This intuition flows naturally from price theory’s so-called
388
partial equilibrium trade-off model, discussed earlier. Nor has it
helped, in this respect, that prominent scholarly advocates of the
transaction cost approach have incorrectly invoked “price theory” in
389
support of their arguments. It should come as no surprise, then, that
generalist judges, for instance, have clung to a seemingly straightforward

383. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20–21.
384. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–97 (1978).
385. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–13 (rejecting per se
condemnation of restraints before the Court, because certain restraints not before the Court were
necessary to make the venture function).
386. See id. at 104–20.
387. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 908 (2007); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 722–26 (1979); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977); see also
William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust, Injury
and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221 (1989) (arguing that antitrust doctrine had evolved
gradually in the previous decades by, inter alia, gradual revision in the scope of per se rules).
388. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (describing partial equilibrium model and its
application to antitrust problems).
389. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (explaining that Richard Posner and Robert Bork
claimed that proper antitrust analysis of non-standard agreements rested on “basic price theory”).
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price-based standard that purports to identify instances in which
390
restraints harm consumers.

IV. Reframing Rule of Reason Analysis
What, then, is the proper baseline from which to analyze restraints
that purport to reduce non-technological transaction costs? To answer
this question, it is useful to return to the example considered—but not
published—by Coase in 1932, that of a supplier that makes relationship391
specific investments to satisfy unique demands of a particular customer.
Coase opined that the supplier may fear that, after the investment, the
customer might switch suppliers, or threaten to do so as a way of
392
exploiting the relationship-specific investments. Such exploitation, of
course, would take the form of the customer’s demand that the supplier
reduce the price of the input, perhaps even below the supplier’s total unit
costs. As a result, a supplier contemplating a relationship-specific
investment would minimize the expected cost of producing the good in
question, if it could obtain some assurance through partial or complete
integration that the customer would not take its business elsewhere, but
393
would instead deal exclusively with the supplier. Or, viewed from the
customer’s perspective, purchasing the new input on the “open market,”
free from contractual restraint, would entail a higher price than purchase
394
pursuant to some sort of restraint. The purchaser could also minimize
these costs if it integrated backwards and thereby took on the task of
395
supplying its own needs.
Courts employing a partial equilibrium approach when evaluating
such agreements would ask whether removal of the restraint would result
in a lower price, thereby suggesting that enforcement of the restraint
results in market power. Given the manner in which courts conduct this
analysis, removal of the restraint “midstream” would in fact appear to
reduce prices, as purchasers exploited the seller’s sunk investments by
396
demanding price cuts, thus giving rise to a prima facie case. Moreover,
even if a defendant could demonstrate that the restraint produces
benefits, such benefits would not manifest themselves as reduced prices,

390. See Howard Margolis, Paradigms & Barriers: How Habits of Mind Govern Scientific
Beliefs 29–42 (1993) (arguing that entrenched mental habits based on common perceptions can
constitute “barriers” preventing scientists from recognizing superior paradigms).
391. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13.
392. Id. at 12.
393. Id. at 13; see also Klein et al., supra note 196, at 298–302 (making a similar point well before
publication of Coase’s 1932 correspondence).
394. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 12–13.
395. Id. at 13 (“[T]he risks inherent in this condition of bilateral monopoly may make the capital`
costs so high that it is cheaper for the original consuming firm to produce [inputs] itself even though
the actual operating efficiency is less.”).
396. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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but would instead tend to increase prices as compared to the status quo
ante. Current law would thus condemn a restraint that in fact enhanced
consumer welfare.
There is, however, another approach to consider, involving a
baseline that requires a different thought experiment. Courts evaluating
such a restraint could imagine a state of affairs—and resulting prices,
quality, and output—that would obtain if the supplier incurred the cost
of the hypothesized specific investment and produced the resulting
differentiated product, but did not employ a non-standard contract to
safeguard its specific investment through some degree of exclusivity. In
this world, the supplier would incur both the cost of the new equipment
and the transaction cost due to the resulting risk of customer
397
opportunism. As a result, the supplier would charge more, and produce
less, than it would if it could restrain the purchasing decisions of its
customer by contract.
Conducted against this baseline, the tests employed by the courts
and enforcement agencies would work just fine. After all, partial or
complete integration by a firm that has already made a specific
investment that exposes it to opportunism will reduce the costs that the
supplier will incur, increase its output, and reduce the price it will charge
398
for the product produced with the new equipment. Thus, if our
hypothetical supplier obtains some form of exclusivity from its customer,
it will no longer face a prospect of opportunism that will induce it to
charge a premium for the newly-differentiated product. Therefore, the
399
firm’s prices will fall and output will rise “as a result of the restraint.” A
test that focuses on the price charged by the defendant measured against
the properly hypothesized baseline will therefore conclude that the
restraint in question will, in fact, reduce prices. As a result, a plaintiff will
not be able to establish a prima facie case against this sort of beneficial
integration under this test.
It should be noted that the baseline just described is not necessarily
hypothetical. There may, for example, be instances in which a firm
initially—and perhaps mistakenly—makes the specific investment in
question, without simultaneously adopting a contractual safeguard. In
these cases, the investing firm will suffer the relevant costs of
opportunism after this investment and, in some cases anyway, will
attempt to raise its prices accordingly to compensate for this risk.
Moreover, if the firm then adopts a contractual safeguard, its costs will

397. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13 (explaining that specialized investment would raise
the cost of capital absent some guarantee against opportunism).
398. See supra notes 230–38 and accompanying text.
399. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 32–35 (asserting that a restraint reducing the prospect of
opportunism will reduce the price charged by the proponent of the restraint); Coase, Origin, supra
note 177, at 12–13 (same).
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fall, and it may reduce its prices accordingly. Indeed, the prospect of such
reduced prices would induce the firm’s trading partners to agree to the
400
new safeguard in the first place. In cases such as this one, the status quo
ante will be that situation in which the firm has made the specific
investment without the safeguard, thereby exposing the firm to costraising opportunism. The restraint in question will, therefore, actually
reduce the costs that the firm incurs and thus may reduce the prices it
charges consumers, with the result that current doctrine will achieve the
correct result, it seems.
Scenarios like the one just discussed will be less prevalent than one
may initially think, however. For one thing, firms that are victims of
unanticipated opportunism may not be able to raise their prices to reflect
an exploitation of sunk costs, at least in the short run. Indeed, the
paradigmatic example of opportunism that Coase invoked involved a
purchaser’s demand that a supplier reduce its price below its total costs,
401
some of which are sunk to the relationship in question. In these
circumstances, the addition of a restraint will not reduce prices; it may
even increase them, by depriving the customer of the ability to exploit
the supplier by threatening to take its business elsewhere. Moreover, if
opportunism has forced the supplier to keep its price down, it is not clear
how the supplier will then be able to induce its opportunistic trading
partners to agree to such a provision.
In any event, a specific investment without a contractual safeguard
and the resulting high price will not constitute an equilibrium and thus is
not likely to occur in the “real world.” Like price theory, transaction cost
economics depends upon the assumption that market participants,
including our hypothetical purchaser and supplier, are rational and
402
forward looking. As such, these participants will at least attempt to
anticipate the sort of opportunism that can follow specific investments
and, where possible, will guard against such behavior via complete or
403
partial integration. Indeed, firms that devise methods of combating
such opportunism will thrive vis à vis those that do not, regardless
404
whether they know why they are thriving. Thus, it seems logical to

400. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 32–35; see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical
Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 145, 184–89 (1997) (explaining how a price
differential can induce an agreement to a provision reducing opportunism).
401. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13; Klein et al., supra note 196, at 298–99.
402. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 44–46.
403. See Williamson, supra note 188, at 72 (“The main case to which transaction cost economics
subscribes has been stated by Frank Knight as follows: ‘Men in general, and within limits, wish to
behave economically, to make their activities and their organization ‘efficient’ rather than wasteful.
This fact does deserve the utmost emphasis . . . .’” (citations omitted) (quoting Frank H. Knight,
Anthropology and Economics, 53 J. Pol. Econ. 247, 252 (1941))).
404. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 211,
216 (1950) (contending that firms that adopt optimal responses to their economic environment will
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assume that most real world specific investments that expose the
investing party to the prospect of opportunism will be accompanied, ex
ante, by some mechanism, at least, that protects the investing firm from
405
opportunism. Thus, in most cases examining non-standard contracts,
courts will not be able to identify a real world baseline of price or output
that accompanies pre-restraint specific investments. A legal test
calibrated to evaluate conduct by irrational firms not likely to survive in
the marketplace will not produce useful results.
If parties, in fact, avoid opportunism by imposing certain restraints
ex ante, then courts and enforcement agencies will have to construct a
purely hypothetical baseline, that is, imagine a world in which the
defendants make relationship-specific investments that give rise to
product differentiation, but do not impose such a restraint. Having
imagined such a world, the tribunal can compare the hypothetical nonrestraint price or output to that which accompanies the restraint.
To determine whether the hypothesized price or output is higher or
lower than that which actually prevails in the market place, a tribunal
will have to predict the impact of the restraint based upon an assessment
of its potential benefits and market power effects. The mere fact that
such a restraint could produce such benefits does not mean that it will do
so. At the same time, the mere fact that the restraint reduces or
eliminates rivalry that would otherwise occur—in this scenario by
preventing a customer from taking her business elsewhere—does not
thereby establish anticompetitive harm. Nor, of course, would proof that
the restraint produced higher prices, or reduced output as compared to
406
the improper baselines employed by current law. Instead, courts would
have to determine directly whether, given the structure of the
marketplace (including the ease with which new firms may enter), the
restraint in question could possibly enhance or protect market power of
407
the parties to it. Moreover, if market structure is conducive to such

survive and thrive relative to those that do not, even if they do not fully understand those conditions
or know their particular practices are the optimal response to them); Coase, Nature of the Firm:
Influence, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 33, 39–40 (1988) (noting that competition will induce firms to adopt the
proper degree of contractual integration).
405. These mechanisms need not take the form of non-standard contracts subject to § 1 of the
Sherman Act. See e.g., Williamson, supra note 66, at 47–48 (stating that firms can sometimes minimize
the risk of opportunism by selecting trading partners with lower propensity of such behavior); Klein &
Saft, supra note 256, at 348 & n.15 (describing a chain restaurant that established franchises in
neighborhoods to increase repeat customers and reduce opportunism).
406. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text (describing baselines employed by current
law).
407. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 216–21 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (finding that defendant’s small share of an unconcentrated market undermined plaintiff’s
claim that the challenged restraint produced anticompetitive harm); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra
note 136, at 253–67; see also AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.5 (articulating standards that enforcement
agencies employ to determine whether entry by new firms may deter or prevent exercises of market power).
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harm, tribunals would have to examine directly whether, in fact, the
restraint produces the sort of benefits the defendant attributes to it, as
well as the magnitude of such benefits. If the restraint does produce
significant benefits, then tribunals would have no choice but to
determine whether those benefits offset the harm identified at the first
step. The results of this inquiry will, of course, replicate the results of an
inquiry into whether the heightened risk of opportunism incurred
without the restraint (the reframed baseline) would result in higher or
lower prices than those associated with the restraint. In short, contrary to
the approach that courts and agencies currently take, reframing rule of
reason analysis along the lines suggested here would eliminate shortcuts
and require courts to do the heavy lifting of determining whether, in fact,
the restraint produces anticompetitive harm and, if so, whether that harm
predominates.

Conclusion
Science employs tested paradigms to solve problems deemed
important by the community, and economic science is no exception. For
decades now, economists and legal scholars have employed workable
competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off model to evaluate numerous
practices governed by the Sherman Act. Moreover, application of this
paradigm has produced useful evaluations of much conduct, including
mergers and unilateral conduct, such as expansion that both realizes
economies of scale and creates or fortifies monopoly power.
At the same time, workable competition and its trade-off model
produced misleading evaluations of non-standard contracts that may
reduce non-technological transaction costs. To be precise, this
framework led economists to interpret such agreements as market-power
based restrictions on rivalry, restrictions that produced no offsetting
(technological) efficiencies. For several decades, this hostility manifested
itself as various per se rules condemning numerous non-standard
agreements.
More recently, so-called transaction cost economics has offered an
alternative account of such agreements. That is, TCE contends that such
agreements reduce the cost of relying upon atomistic markets to conduct
economic activity. Such costs take two forms: technological transaction
costs and non-technological transaction costs. TCE has not gone
unheeded. Instead, courts and the enforcement agencies have relied
upon TCE’s teachings to contract the scope of per se rules, holding that
numerous restraints, once condemned outright as unlawful per se, should
now be analyzed under the rule of reason.
Nonetheless, the standard methodology for conducting rule of
reason analysis still reflects significant influence of the partial
equilibrium trade-off paradigm, whereby courts attempt to assess
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whether the restraint produces harm in the form of enhanced market
power and to compare any such harm with the benefits produced by the
restraint. In so doing, courts and agencies treat the price or output that
existed before the restraint as a valid baseline against which to measure
the impact of a challenged agreement. Where there is no such baseline,
courts perform a sort of thought experiment, asking a hypothetical
question, namely whether price would rise (or output would fall) if the
restraint were removed. Both baselines make perfect sense within the
partial equilibrium framework, which assumes away the possibility of
transaction costs, opportunism, and shifts in demand for the underlying
product.
TCE represents a genuine scientific revolution that undermines
workable competition’s interpretation of non-standard contracts. One
might therefore expect that any rule of reason test based upon this
framework is bound to fail. In point of fact, however, the partial
equilibrium trade-off paradigm can produce useful analyses of
agreements that may reduce technological transaction costs, that is, the
sort of bargaining and information costs on which Ronald Coase focused
in his seminal work on the subject. Such costs, it turns out, are analogous
to the sort of technological production costs normally recognized within
workable competition and its partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm.
Thus, application of the current method of rule of reason analysis to
restraints that yield such benefits will produce correct results.
Current law fares far less well when analyzing restraints that may
reduce non-technological transaction costs. Such costs exist because of
several departures from workable competition, departures not
incorporated with the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm. Such
unrecognized departures include specific investments that may enhance
demand for the defendant’s product, the passage of time between
investment and payoff, and the threat that these conditions will give rise
to opportunistic behavior and, thus, externalities. These departures
render useless the baselines that courts currently employ when
evaluating the impact of challenged restraints. To be precise, the
application of such baselines excludes the possibility that apparent price
increases or reductions in output reflect the opportunism-reducing
effects of such restraints. Such effects would naturally manifest
themselves as increased specific investment, including investment in
promotion, investments that could enhance demand—and thus price—
for the new product in question. While removal of the restraint could
appear to result in reduced prices, or even higher output in some cases,
such prices and output would reflect suboptimal specific investments
and/or the opportunist exploitation of investments already made.
Courts’ continued application of the trade-off paradigm to contracts
that produce non-technological efficiencies seems puzzling at first, since
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judges have relied upon TCE when contracting or eliminating numerous
per se rules. Closer analysis, however, helps explain the persistence of
this error. The trade-off paradigm has served antitrust well, solving
problems deemed important by the antitrust community. Moreover, the
transaction costs that Coase initially identified were readily incorporated
within the partial equilibrium framework, given their similarity to
technological production costs. Finally, Supreme Court decisions
examining non-standard contracts have arisen in procedural or factual
contexts that obscured, or obviated altogether, any conflict between TCE
and the trade-off model. Thus, the rise of TCE has not resulted in the
sort of crisis-generating anomalies that cause practitioners to question or
reform a settled paradigm.
The realization that the rule of reason analysis of restraints that
overcome non-technological transaction costs rests upon improper
baselines requires courts and agencies to reframe their analysis of such
restraints so as to achieve correct results. Such reframing entails the
selection of a new baseline against which to measure the impact of
challenged restraints. That is, courts should select as a baseline the price
and output that would prevail in the marketplace if the defendants
entered the venture in question and made investments specific to that
venture, but without the challenged restraint. In this way, tribunals can
determine the impact of the restraint itself, while holding all other
variables constant. Proper application of this standard can distinguish
restraints that reduce the welfare of consumers from those that enhance
it.
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